The battle in Idlib is being watched very closely by the military experts of Russia, Iran, China and the Islamic Resistance, as it manifests NATO’s tactical order of battle.
Turkey, the second largest military force in NATO, launched its illegal aggression against the sovereign state of Syria, utilizing NATO’s military tactics and equipment.
Thus, Ankara’s military action in Idlib is part of NATO operations.
At the tactical level, so far the war in the Syrian province reflects the limitations of NATO’s mode of operations.
When Ankara invaded Syria and deployed its expensive military drones to spearhead the campaign, the Syrian army was at a technological disadvantaged, so it immediately suffered large casualties.
Within a few days, however, the Syrian army managed to adopt to Nato’s military tactics and began to nuetralize Turkey’s aerial supremacy.
This was clearly demonstrated by the fact that within 2-3 days of losing control of the strategic town of Saraqeb, the Syrian army managed to retake it despite Turkey’s intense aerial and artillery bombardment.
Saqaqeb is an important town as it is within shooting range of the Damascus-Aleppo highway—the M5—known to the Syrians simply as the “International Road” and passes through all the major cities of Syria.
The Turkish army invading Idlib had to rely on its takfiri proxies for the ground battle.
For political reasons, Turkey is trying to avoid its own soldiers engaging directly with the more experienced Syrian army.
High Turkish casualties in a war of Erdogan’s making would not go down well with many voters in Turkey.
It should be noted that the takfiri terrorists, deliberately projected as “superb” fighters by the West’s corporate media, were unable to hold on to even their minimal gains despite heavy Turkish aerial and artillery support.
This ground reality shows that the last enclave of the takfiris in Syria poses no serious political threat to the Syrian government or Islamic Iran.
Thus, in terms of cost-benefit analysis, maintaining the Idlib enclave as a potential future leverage against the entire Middle East is no longer worth it for Washington or its regional vassals.
When examining the events in Idlib it should be borne in mind that the Syrian army’s latest advances in restoring sovereignty over its territory can also be seen as Iran’s broader response to General Qassem Soleimani’s assassination.
After the murder of its top commander, the leadership of Islamic Iran vowed that its broader response would be the expulsion of US presence from the region.
From this perspective, tolerating a territorial comfort zone for takfiri forces where they could re-organize and be utilized as NATO’s proxies once again, would be illogical.
Now that it is officially confirmed that NATO lost Saraqeb and that the Russian military police is patrolling it, Ankara has no choice but to accept that it has failed in Syria both militarily and politically.