Mohamed Ousman
Bashar al-Asad’s foreign policy combined Arab nationalist rhetoric, opposition to Israel, strategic alignment with Islamic Iran and Russia, and periodic engagement with western diplomacy. Syria fought Israel in 1948, 1967 and 1973. Israel colonised the Golan Heights after the 1967 war, while Syria never concluded a peace treaty with Israel. A 1974 disengagement agreement created a relatively stable military line, but Damascus continuously demanded the return of the Golan Heights.
Syria’s relationship with the United States deteriorated because of its support for the Islamic Resistance, its alliance with Islamic Iran, involvement in Lebanon and later allegations concerning terrorism, weapons programs and chemical weapons. Washington designated Syria a State Sponsor of Terrorism on December 29, 1979, imposing restrictions on foreign assistance, defence exports, dual-use exports and financial dealings.
Additional sanctions followed, after 2004 and during the 2011 zionist and imperialist backed insurrection that hijacked the legitimate grievances of the Syrian people.
Takfiri Foreign Policy
The fall of Bashar al-Asad on December 8, 2024 produced a dramatic Syrian foreign-policy reorientation. The micro-managed leadership of Muhammad al-Jolani (aka Ahmed al-Shara’) under zionist and imperialist supervision sought international recognition, economic reconstruction and relief from sanctions while distancing Damascus from the former government’s dependence on Islamic Iran and Russia. Rather than maintaining the previous government’s overt strategic confrontation with Israel, the new regime entered indirect and then direct security contacts with the zionist entity.
In 2025, Syrian and Israeli representatives held face-to-face discussions concerning border security, Israel’s military incursions and restoration of the 1974 disengagement framework. In August 2026, the Syrian foreign minister held discussions with the Head of Mossad, Israel’s espionage agency.
Relations with Washington also changed rapidly. The US progressively relaxed sanctions, terminated its general Syria sanctions program in July 2025, while retaining measures against Asad, associates, human-rights abusers and other destabilising actors.
Washington subsequently removed Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham from its Foreign Terrorist Organization designation in 2025. On August 24, 2026, Syria was formally removed from the US State Sponsors of Terrorism list, ending a designation dating from 1979.
Syrian Foreign Policy through Imam Muhammad al-‘Asi’s Qur’anic Framework
Al-‘Asi’s Qur’anic framework begins from a fundamental premise: political conduct cannot be evaluated merely by whether it produces immediate security, economic relief or diplomatic recognition. It must be assessed according to the relationship between political power, justice, Allah’s guidance and the collective independence of the Muslims.
His criticism of modern “Muslim” governments is, therefore, directed not simply at particular diplomatic decisions but at the deeper structure within which those decisions are made. Al-‘Asi argues that “definitions of justice currently relate to self-centered constituencies, national priorities, sub-national classes or global realities which conflict with the Qur’an”.
From this perspective, Syria’s removal from the American State Sponsors of Terrorism list is both an opportunity and a test. The designation had constrained foreign assistance, defence exports, dual-use trade and financial relations since 1979.
Its removal, therefore, has substantial practical significance: it opens Syria to international economic integration. Yet, al-‘Asi’s analysis would ask what political price accompanies this reintegration?
The June 2025 American sanctions termination explicitly connected engagement with Syria to expectations concerning normalisation with Israel, counter-terrorism and other US strategic priorities. Thus, economic liberation from sanctions does not automatically constitute political independence.
This distinction is central to al-‘Asi’s critique of contemporary Muslim rulers. He maintains that “before colonialism, imperialism and capitalism robbed Muslims of their resources they drove a wedge into their proper relationship with Allah by interfering in their understanding of His scripture”. In this reading, sanctions relief can be beneficial to Syrian civilians while simultaneously creating new dependencies if reconstruction becomes conditional upon external geopolitical alignment.
The Qur’anic question is, therefore, not whether Syria should trade with the west, but whether Syrian statecraft remains governed by an independent Islamic moral and political purpose.
The meeting between Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani and Mossad chief Roman Gofman illustrates this tension. On August 14, 2026, the two reportedly discussed Turkiye’s growing military presence in Syria. After Israel’s strikes on a Syrian airbase, Syrian and Israeli officials subsequently held high-level talks in Jordan aimed at de-escalation.
These contacts should not automatically be equated with a peace treaty or recognition of Israel’s claims. Indeed, Damascus has simultaneously demanded Israeli withdrawal toward its pre-December 2024 positions, not pre-1967 positions.
Al-‘Asi would likely regard the strategic direction with suspicion as security cooperation evolves into political dependency. He argues that “Muslims are an independent, self-governing power base that does not rely on other governments or coalitions to survive”.
His objection is not necessarily to negotiation itself. He explicitly recognizes that a modus operandi with non-Muslim powers existed during the Prophet’s leadership. His concern is whether engagement preserves Muslim political agency or gradually incorporates Muslim governments into structures controlled by Taghut i.e. those who concentrate and abuse power.
This is particularly relevant to his criticism of Arab-Israel diplomacy. Al-‘Asi argues that Muslim governments that ignore divine guidance become more comfortable with zionist power than with Ummah-wide Muslim interests. He also describes the Israel challenge as an “octopus with global tentacles” whose wider dimensions remain concealed unless the Qur’an informs political analysis.
Within that framework, the Mossad meeting would require examination beyond its immediate security purpose: does it protect Syrian sovereignty, or institutionalises Israel’s influence over Syria’s strategic choices? Al-‘Asi stresses that societal transformation cannot be achieved through a “quick fix” or imitation of western civilisation.
Syria’s challenge is, therefore, deeper than changing alliances: it concerns the political, economic and moral foundations of the new state.
Consequently, liberal pragmatists would argue that US delisting should be interpreted neither as simple liberation nor as automatic capitulation. It removes a major obstacle to Syrian reconstruction, but its significance depends upon what Damascus does with the increased diplomatic space.
Likewise, dialogue with Israel may serve de-escalation and protect Syrian interests, but it becomes indefensible under al-‘Asi’s framework as it develops into ideological alignment, political dependency or abandonment of justice. His central criterion would be whether Syria gains genuine sovereignty and pursues justice in the process—or merely exchanges one form of external dependence for another.
Syrian Foreign Policy through Imam Zafar Bangash’s Seerah Framework
Bangash’s Seerah framework places political power, state-building, diplomacy and justice at the centre of the Prophet’s method (Power Manifestations of the Sirah, 2011). His analysis of the Covenant of Madinah emphasises that the Prophet did not construct political authority through permanent confrontation alone. He first consolidated a community, established institutions and defined rights and responsibilities among different constituencies.
Bangash describes the Covenant as a constitutional arrangement recognising the rights and obligations of the inhabitants of the Islamic State in Madinah.
Applied to contemporary Syria, this framework produces a more nuanced assessment of the US delisting and Israeli contacts. The Prophet’s diplomacy demonstrates that engagement with non-Muslim political actors is not intrinsically illegitimate. Treaties around Madinah could secure peace, protect the emerging polity and create strategic space for consolidation. Bangash specifically stresses that the Prophet’s treaties with neighbouring tribes were intended to secure peace around Madinah and prevent hostile forces from exploiting its vulnerabilities.
While, Syria’s engagement with Washington and Israel may be interpreted as statecraft if its purpose is to secure Syrian sovereignty, stabilise borders and create conditions for reconstruction; its antagonism of anti-zionist resistance groups fuels a significant contradiction. The recent Syrian-Israel discussions have been framed around de-escalation, Israeli military activity and restoration of the 1974 disengagement arrangement all of which create further tension.
Bangash’s Seerah perspective also stresses power. The Prophet’s diplomacy operated alongside the consolidation of an effective Islamic political and military base; diplomacy was not dependence but an instrument of state strategy. Bangash describes the Madinan phase as the acquisition of “hard power” after the earlier pledges and community-building efforts.
Consequently, Syria’s delisting is valuable insofar as it strengthens its capacity to govern itself. But as sanctions relief is contingent upon surrendering strategic autonomy, the analogy with Madinah weakens. The decisive question is whether Syria uses diplomacy to enlarge its independent Islamic political capacity, as the Prophet used treaties to consolidate the Islamic State in Madinah, or diplomacy progressively transfers strategic authority to stronger external powers.
The Mossad meeting is, therefore, best judged by its outcomes: sovereignty, security, justice and bargaining power, or a regression towards normalization with Israel, (rather than by the mere fact that dialogue occurred).
Syrian Foreign Policy through Dr. Kalim Siddiqui’s Islamic Movement Theory
Dr Siddiqui’s Islamic Movement Theory approaches Syria from a more structural and civilisational perspective. Siddiqui argues that the contemporary Muslim world suffers from fragmentation into nation-states and political systems shaped by western colonisation. His theory places great importance on political power: the Islamic movement must develop the capacity to transform political structures rather than merely reform their surface features.
His later writings describe the Islamic State as the highest form of social organisation capable of expressing the collective purpose of the Ummah.
From this perspective, Syria’s removal from the US terrorism list is significant because it changes the material environment in which the Syrian state operates. Sanctions relief can provide access to investment, trade and reconstruction. Yet Siddiqui would distinguish between acquiring resources and acquiring independent political power. A state may be economically reintegrated while remaining strategically dependent.
The US decision itself indicates this conditionality: Washington linked Syria’s removal with expectations concerning stability, terrorism, foreign fighters and normalising relations with Israel.
Siddiqui’s theory would, therefore, ask whether the new Syrian “rulers” are using international engagement as a transitional strategy for strengthening their own political capacity or allowing external powers to define Syria’s strategic objectives. His critique of Muslim nation-states is especially relevant because he argues that nationalism fragments the Ummah and prevents Muslims from developing an Ummah-wide political project.
The Mossad meeting creates an even sharper dilemma. From a conventional realist perspective, communication with Israel can reduce the probability of war, manage border disputes and constrain Turkish-Israel escalation. The August 2026 discussions were explicitly connected to military tensions and de-escalation.
From Siddiqui’s perspective, the crucial issue would be whether such diplomacy contributes to autonomous Islamic political development or normalises incorporation into a regional order dominated by Israel and western powers.
Siddiqui’s Islamic Movement theory does not reduce political transformation to isolated diplomatic gestures. The movement must develop leadership, institutions, intellectual coherence and sufficient power to shape historical change.
His Stages of Islamic Revolution presents political transformation as a process rather than an instantaneous event. Therefore, Syria’s present diplomacy should be assessed as a stage in a larger struggle over political autonomy and integration into the larger Ummah-wide interests.
Liberal pragmatists may argue that delisting is strategically useful and engagement with Israel may be tactically useful. However, neither is inherently emancipatory especially in light of Syria’s anti-Islamic resistance and takfiri posture.
Their ultimate significance depends on whether the Syrian state develops independent Islamic political capacity and justice to integrate into the Ummah, or merely becomes a new participant in the existing nationalist regional and western power structure.
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