Islamic Movement

Sunni Scholars’ Opposition to the Concept of Walayat al-Faqih – Part III

Mohamed Ousman

Muharram 16, 14482026-07-01

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Unfortunately some—perhaps many—Sunni scholars have not been able to rise above their sectarian prejudices to endorse the concept of Walayat al-Faqih as a legitimate form of Islamic governance model. This is all the more depressing since many of these scholars are otherwise quite knowledgeable about Islam.

Below is a list of Sunni scholars who are publicly known to be critics of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s state system, policies, or leadership.

1. Strong, explicit critics of the Islamic Republic in Iran

The late Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi (Egypt/Qatar) was one of the most influential Sunni jurists of modern times. He criticized Islamic Iran repeatedly over perceived Shi‘i sectarian expansion proselytization concerns, Syrian war alignment with Bashar al-Asad and other regional interventions.

He strongly opposed Islamic Iran’s regional policies and ideological export and unwittingly supported the zionist Sunni-opposition movements against Islamic Iran-aligned governments.

Syrian Muslim Brotherhood leadership e.g., Ali Sadr al-Din al-Bayanuni criticized Islamic Iran for perceived support of the Asad regime, its alleged sectarian influence in Syria and regional Shi‘i political expansion.

Prominent pro-zionist Saudi Salafi establishmentarian clerical voices have historically criticized Islamic Iran as “Safavid expansionism” (ideological framing) and opposed Islamic Iran’s influence in Iraq, Syria and Yemen. These court ulama have had little to say about the Arabian regimes’ embrace of zionism and its occupation of Palestine.

2. Moderate but clear critics of Islamic Iran’s regional role

Abdullah bin Bayyah (Mauritania/UAE-based scholar) promotes interfaith and Sunni-Shi‘i dialogue but has criticized sectarian conflict driven by regional powers and instability caused by Iranian–Saudi rivalry.

He is not anti-Iran ideologically but is critical of Islamic Iran’s regional policies and escalation dynamics.

Sunni scholars from Iraqi Sunni institutions (post-2003 Iraq) criticized Islamic Iran’s influence in Iraqi politics and concerns about anti-imperial militia dominance aligned with Islamic Iran.

Their opposition was to Islamic Iran’s political/military influence rather than theology.

Afghan Taliban-linked Sunni clerical voices occasionally criticized Islamic Iran on border issues, sectarian tensions and refugee treatment disputes. Although Afghanistan has maintained highly pragmatic relations with Islamic Iran post-2021.

3. Limited / indirect criticism of Islamic Iran

Taqi Usmani (Pakistan) generally avoids direct geopolitical confrontation. He has emphasized Sunni doctrinal independence and caution regarding sectarian state models.

Notably, he has refrained from major public anti-Iran campaigns or ideological critique but has also not endorsed the Islamic Republic of Iran’s system.

Tariq Jamil (Pakistan) focuses on spiritual preaching, unity discourse and avoids criticism of Islamic Iran as a state.

Hence, there are three distinct “types” of criticism:

1. Ideological/political opposition where Islamic Iran is seen as a geopolitical rival or ideological project. This opposition is common among zionist Syrian opposition-aligned scholars and Gulf-state aligned clerical discourse.
2. Regional policy criticism where the focus is on the Syrian war, Iraq influence, Yemen conflict. It does not necessarily reject Islamic Iran as a state system.
3. Neutral/non-aligned distancing where sectarian politics is avoided and the emphasis is on unity rather than confrontation.

Explicit Sunni criticism of Islamic Iran exists mostly in geopolitical or regional conflict contexts, and to a lesser degree in theological rejection. Strong ideological opposition is more institutional (state-linked or movement-linked) than individual scholarly consensus.

Most globally known Sunni scholars either avoid direct confrontation, or focus on unity discourse rather than state criticism.

Thus, those who are “Pro-Islamic Axis of Resistance” represent issue-based alignment, not endorsement of Islamic Iran as a state. Scholars who support Palestinian resistance / anti-occupation struggle may acknowledge Islamic Iran’s role in that struggle but do not endorse Islamic Iran’s governance system and ideology of Walayat al-Faqih. This includes Palestinian-aligned Sunni scholars, Lebanon Sunni clerics like Ahmed al-Zain, conference participants in Islamic Iran unity forums and general Muslim unity scholars.

“Pro–Islamic Iran State Endorsement” means explicit endorsement of Iran’s leadership or support for the Islamic Republic’s governance model of Walayat al-Faqih. This Islamic responsibility is more than political solidarity. It demands Sunni and Shi‘i jurisprudential consensus.

Unfortunately it includes Sunni clerics inside Islamic Iran, Iranian Sunni institutional scholars and crisis-time coalitions endorsing Islamic Iran’s leadership.

The confusion occurs because many scholars sound “pro-Iran” when they are actually only “pro-resistance” and in Islamic discourse, resistance is an issue-based geopolitical stance whereas state endorsement is acceptance of Islamic Iran’s leadership and authority.

These overlap only in limited, mostly Islamic Iran-based institutional settings, not global scholarship.

For 47 years, the Islamic Republic of Iran has valiantly resisted US imperialism and zionist colonialism. It has made immense sacrifices to support the Palestinian cause and struggle.

Despite this, many Sunni scholars remain trapped in sectarian prejudices and are unable to realize that the concept of Walayat al-Faqih is as valid as the concept of Khilafah. In fact, they are one and the same with different labels.

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