News & Analysis

Russian Withdrawal from Azerbaijan: A Grand Geopolitical Chess Move

Akhmet Makhmoudov

Shawwal 22, 14452024-05-01

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The Russian army pulling out of Azerbaijani region of Karabakh did not get much media coverage in the west. It should have, given the great significance the Russian move carries.

Prior to understanding the importance of Moscow’s withdrawal, it is vital to look at the most likely reason why Russian pullout was not widely reported in the western mainstream media.

The western regimes’ propaganda machines have been working overtime churning out anti-Russian diatribes in an attempt to project it as an imperialist state hellbent on aggression. Moscow’s voluntary withdrawal from Azerbaijan undermines this narrative and poses a serious dilemma for the collective west.

It needs emphasizing that Russia’s departure from Karabakh is not merely a PR stunt. It is a geopolitical chess move in one of the world’s most sensitive regions: the Caucasus.

Those who lack a proper understanding of the Caucasus will find it difficult to explain why Russia—an imperial power—would all of a sudden leave, and do so voluntarily. After all, throughout its history, Russia has been trying to establish its presence in the Caucasus.

An important part of the explanation lies in understanding the relationship between the family-based regime in Azerbaijan and Russia. It must be kept in mind that the regime and the Azerbaijani state are two separate entities. The state system serves the regime in power in Baku, not vice versa. The unelected Aliyev regime established its de-facto kleptocratic control in 1995.

It was founded by the KGB General, the hard-nosed Soviet apparatchik, Geidar Aliyev (now deceased) father of the current ruler, Ilham Aliyev. Part of the reason the Aliyevs have managed to maintain their iron grip on Azerbaijan is their close relationship with Moscow. The regime has always been mindful of the fact that in order to stay in power, it must never cross Russia’s redlines.

Even today as Russia faces virtually complete economic blockade launched by western regimes, Moscow manages to subtly sell its energy products to western buyers via Azerbaijan. As the Economist Intelligence Unit reported in July 2023, while Azerbaijan increased its supply of gas to the EU, Aliyev is only able to do so because he is buying additional gas from Russia, supposedly for domestic consumption.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s close personal relationship with Aliyev has convinced the Russian leadership that Baku will remain loyal to Moscow as long as this family is in power. Aliyev is also confident that western regimes will not seek his downfall. Calm in Azerbaijan is needed to maintain stability in the already unstable energy markets.

Azerbaijan is an important transit route for Central Asia’s energy products. More importantly, apartheid Israel purchases a significant amount of oil from the Aliyev regime. The zionist lobby that exercises inordinate influence over western regimes, will prevent the western ruling elite from destabilizing the regime in Baku as it will undermine the zionists’ energy needs.

At home, the Aliyev regime can now use Russian troop withdrawal from Karabakh to dismiss criticism from domestic opposition for bringing Russian troops into the country. This was the first time that Russian troops were stationed on Azerbaijan soil. When it regained formal independence after the Soviet Union disintegrated at the beginning of the nineteen nineties, all foreign troops, primarily Russian, left the republic.

Let us now consider some other issues. As Russia’s trade and economic compass reorients towards Asia, the Caucasus and Central Asia become a more vital logistical hub of the new emerging economic order.

After years of delays, Russia finally loaned 1.3 billion euros to Iran last year. This was to help build a planned railway route that will connect Russia to the Indian Ocean via Iran.

More importantly, by moving its troops out of Azerbaijan, Russia has deprived western regimes of a pretext to pressure the former Soviet states to side with them against Moscow. Many post-Soviet regimes no longer see Russia as a menacing power against whom they need the west’s protection.

In fact, by siding with the west, post-Soviet states will create problems for themselves and their republics could potentially turn into Ukraine-like disasters. The rulers of the Central Asian states are not oblivious of this fact.

With its withdrawal from Azerbaijan, Russia has also indirectly sent a message to Islamic Iran. The Kremlin does not see Tehran as a regional adversary. Rather, it views Iran as a partner whom it trusts and with whom it can work for mutual benefit. Russia has thus cemented a fair and balanced political framework with Islamic Iran.

Azerbaijan now forms a geopolitical buffer zone signaling that Tehran and Moscow have moved beyond the “historical rivals” narrative.

The Russian withdrawal will also indirectly incentivize Georgia. The Tblisi regime will now have to think about its geopolitical overtures towards the European Union and the US carefully.

Georgia has significant chunks of territory occupied by Russia. While it is unlikely that Moscow will cede the occupied lands of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Moscow might allow some form of social and economic access for Georgia to those territories.

What this means is that western regimes are now deprived of geopolitical pressure points against Russia in the Caucasus and Central Asia. In this developing scenario, their main focus will now be on the war in Ukraine which is not going well for western trouble-makers.

Another problem with this scenario is that the war in Ukraine is being fought at the doorsteps of western Europe. Many people in Europe can literally hear the thunder of Russian artillery and missiles exploding over Ukrainian cities and towns.

The war’s close proximity levels the playing field between Russia and NATO. The days of wars with few consequences for western regimes have come to an end.

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