Omar Ahmed
On September 9, 2025, residents of Doha were jolted by the unimaginable: an Israeli airstrike in the affluent Legtaifiya district, also known as West Bay Lagoon. Within hours, Israeli military officials confirmed they had targeted senior Hamas leaders allegedly present in the Qatari capital.
The strike killed six civilians, none of whom was the intended target. Worse still, those targeted were reportedly nearing a ceasefire agreement that could have ended the war.
The zionist entity’s flagrant violation of Qatari sovereignty marks a dangerous new threshold in its regional belligerence. Qatar, a Persian Gulf state that has long hosted diplomatic dialogue and resistance delegations, at the request of the US, one must add, has now found itself on the receiving end of the occupation state’s expanding war.
The push for a military alliance
The zionist entity’s attack catalyzed an unprecedented joint summit between the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), held in Doha. For the first time, Arab and Islamic states seriously discussed the prospect of a unified military front. The core idea: an Arab-led military alliance built on a collective defence doctrine akin to NATO’s Article 5, which considers an attack on one member as an attack on all.
While nuclear-armed Pakistan proposed a joint intelligence network to monitor Israeli military assets, the most substantial suggestion came from Egypt, which sought to revive its shelved 2015 initiative for an Arab defence alliance. Originally conceived to address the war on Yemen, the plan was sidelined as Riyadh opted to lead its own ad hoc coalition. But today, the primary threat has shifted: from Sana‘a to Tel Aviv.
In fact, Egypt and Saudi Arabia had, just prior to the occupation state’s airstrike, made headway on a joint naval force designed to operate independently of the US and UK to secure Red Sea shipping lanes. Though initially aimed at countering Yemen’s Ansarallah-aligned armed forces, the initiative may now pivot to serve as a deterrent against the zionist entity.
Within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), provisions for collective defence already exist under the NATO-style Joint Defence Agreement. Articles 2 and 3 stipulate that an attack on any member state requires a military response.
In the wake of the Israeli strike, Qatar convened an emergency GCC meeting to explore military options. One likely scenario involves bolstering the Peninsula Shield Force—the GCC’s standing multinational force of roughly 40,000 troops—with air and naval capabilities to serve as a regional deterrent.
At present, discussions are ongoing, but Egypt’s blueprint was initially reported as having been rejected by Qatar and the UAE, although later reports deny this claim. In any case, the challenge lies not in political will, but in operational feasibility.
Weapons dependency: a structural vulnerability
Arab states remain heavily reliant on foreign weapon systems, particularly from the US. The militaries of the GCC, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt are built around US-made platforms. Algeria and others lean on Russian arms. This fragmentation presents immediate hurdles for interoperability, but the bigger issue is control.
US hardware is notoriously expensive and logistically dependent on American supply chains, with GCC states racking up a collective defence bill of $130 billion annually. Saudi F-15s, for instance, must be sent back to the US for maintenance under contracts with Boeing and Pratt & Whitney. In effect, Washington retains a kill switch on Arab military capacity.
General Surasit Thanadtang, former president of Thailand’s National Defence College, mentioned that despite Thailand buying second-hand US aircraft, permission still has to be sought for upgrades, even domestically made.
“It’s like we are renting the aircraft from the US,” said General Thanadtang.
Such control is fatal if US authorities decide that Made in America weaponry is going to be used for military actions going against their interests.
The same holds true for Qatar’s French-made Rafale jets. Unlike India, Qatar was not offered localization rights for spare parts and ammunition. In a future conflict where US interests diverge from Arab priorities, the Pentagon could simply shut off the weapons pipeline.
Even the UAE, despite having the region’s most advanced domestic arms industry, still depends on western components, particularly in guidance and sensor systems. Worse, Emirati forces themselves have grown reliant on private military contractors and imported platforms.
Beyond the Gulf: the Pakistan factor
Among the voices calling for a strategic response, Pakistan’s stands out. In Doha, Islamabad proposed not just intelligence coordination but the creation of a regional “task force” to pre-empt future Israeli strikes.
While vague in official statements, Pakistani officials appear to be pointing toward a reinforced version of the Peninsula Shield Force, integrating Egyptian, Iraqi, and possibly Pakistani personnel.
Pakistan’s motivations are multi-layered. The country recently collaborated with Turkiye in countering Indian military aggression in May 2025. Turkish drones, advisors, and ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) support were critical in neutralizing Indian strikes. That experience has emboldened Islamabad’s appetite for a greater regional military role. China’s assistance was also an important component of Pakistan’s defence posture.
Moreover, the country has signed a “Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement” (SMDA) with Saudi Arabia, which declares that an attack on either country will be considered an attack on both.
Pakistani pilots have long served on secondment in Gulf air forces, with a legacy dating back to the 1967 war with Israel. Some volunteer pilots have been credited by Pakistani and Arab sources with downing Israeli aircraft while serving under Arab air force commands. Islamabad, nuclear-armed and battle-hardened, views any anti-Israel alliance as an opportunity to reassert itself as a military heavyweight.
Iran and the alliance dilemma
The Iranian factor remains a sticking point. While Egyptian officials have signalled openness to rapprochement with Tehran, memories are still fresh: Cairo’s original 2015 alliance pitch was directed against the Sana‘a government, a key Iranian ally in the region’s Resistance Axis.
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian welcomed the Arab League-OIC discussions, warning that any Arab or Islamic capital could be next. Still, Tehran’s support is conditional. Any alliance that targets the Ansarallah movement or other Iranian-aligned forces would undermine Iran’s regional calculus. More troubling for Tehran is the prospect of a nuclear-armed Pakistan participating in a bloc that could, in theory, pivot against Iranian interests.
To move forward, alliance architects will need to draw firm red lines—clarifying the scope, mandate, and conditions of military activation. A broad anti-Israel posture may unify participants, but divergent regional priorities, particularly regarding Yemen and Syria, could splinter the coalition before it even forms.
In the interim, GCC states may look to enhance the Peninsula Shield Force with Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities and limited strike assets. As a symbolic measure, its mere expansion could act as a deterrent.
Over the longer term, inclusion of Egypt, Iraq, Turkiye, Pakistan—and potentially Iran—will require intense diplomacy, especially over Syria, whose fractured sovereignty poses its own complications.
But the urgency is undeniable. The zionist entity’s strike on Doha has changed the calculus. Arab states can no longer assume their capitals are off-limits. Whether a fully integrated alliance emerges or a leaner, GCC-based force takes shape, the need for an independent, coordinated Arab military response to Israeli aggression has never been more stark.
The plot to create chaos and mayhem in the Middle East originates in the criminal minds of the Zionists that the Bani Saud pay for, their Be...
What is the reality of Al Jazeera's "leaks" over differences between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his intelligence chiefs? ...
Like children fighting over toys, Saudi and Qatari rulers are involved in infantile squabbles much to the annoyance of their US-Nato masters...
