Crescent International
While the phrase ‘war is the mother of invention’ is often used in reference to technical and scientific advancements, the Russia-NATO proxy war in Ukraine demonstrates that it also applies to political ingenuity.
Prior to the full-scale war in Ukraine, one of Russia’s most vulnerable political issues was the uncertainty surrounding the long-term durability of the system established by President Vladimir Putin.
The concern was what will happen after his departure from power.
Although Putin successfully dismantled the dominance of the oligarchs of the 1990s and empowered the security apparatus—the political system remained heavily personalized.
It revolved primarily around Putin himself, lacking strong institutional foundations that could ensure continuity of his policies once he was gone.
Russia’s proxy war against NATO in Ukraine changed this.
It provided Putin’s government with an opportunity to create a political system which identifies itself in opposition to western regimes and places itself as an alternative to western hegemony.
In contrast to western regimes, which seek global hegemony, Russia is seeking regional hegemony over the former USSR, and global respect.
Prior to the Ukraine war, this formulation of Russia’s vision of itself lacked significant popular support and societal momentum.
Given that western regimes have made it clear that through the proxy war in Ukraine, they aim to inflict a strategic defeat on Russia, the Kremlin and the Russian society now fully recognize that the strategic geopolitical standoff with NATO regimes will persist for the foreseeable future.
To withstand this prolonged confrontation, Russia is not only modernizing its military and economic sectors but also overhauling the structure and organizational culture of its state machinery.
Nothing signals this shift more clearly than the widely supported national initiative, ‘Time of Heroes’, launched for veterans and current participants of the war in Ukraine.
This program, which began in March 2024, seeks to identify and prepare individuals who served in military operations in Ukraine for mid-to high-level government positions.
Closely overseen by President Putin, the project is modeled on the standards of the School of Governors and Leaders of Russia programs.
According to Russian media, eligible servicemen must hold university degrees, possess managerial experience, and have clean criminal records.
Putin referred to these individuals as the country’s “true elite,” stating they should “lead regions, enterprises, and the largest public projects.”
What may appear to be a simple bureaucratic maneuver is, in reality, a strategic recalibration with profound implications for Russia—both domestically and internationally.
The emerging political elite in Russia will likely be composed of individuals who have experienced the war in Ukraine firsthand—those who have lost comrades to western-supplied weapons and military personnel.
This generation of leaders will not merely inherit power; they will carry with them a deeply personal and ideological commitment to the trajectory established under Putin.
Their lived experiences in the conflict will translate into a political worldview shaped by confrontation with the west, national sacrifice, and a sense of historical mission.
As a result, this new elite is likely to be firmly invested in preserving and advancing Putin’s policies, seeing them not just as a matter of statecraft, but as continuation of a struggle in which they were direct participants.
It would not be surprising to witness western policymakers and scholars, in hindsight, portraying the Putin era as a more favorable period for the west’s strategic engagement—or even co-option—of Russia.
Despite frequent western criticism of Putin’s policies, the geopolitical framework under his leadership still allowed for a degree of predictability, diplomatic communication, and mutual economic interdependence.
In contrast, the emerging post-Putin political class—shaped by war, loss, and a hardened worldview—may prove far less receptive to western influence or accommodation.
Ironically, the very figures once deemed adversarial may come to be viewed as comparatively pragmatic in the face of a new elite forged in the crucible of direct confrontation.
There are many variables in the proxy war between Russia and the US-led NATO in Ukraine. The economic dimension is one of them but it is not...
Russia was left with no choice but to take strong action in Ukraine to prevent its becoming a NATO member, and to end the genocide of Russia...
How Islamic Iran should deal with Russia is the subject of this analysis in which a realistic assessment of the reality is called for.
