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News & Analysis

Why The Taliban Are Being Courted By China, Russia And America

Omar Ahmed

Image Source - AI-ChatGPT

The year 2021 marked a watershed moment for Afghanistan. And August 15, 2021 would come to be marked as the day when the Taliban returned to power in Kabul, signalling the end of 20 years of NATO-backed puppet regimes.

Iconic images of US forces chaotically abandoning Afghanistan will remain memorialised in history, drawing parallels with the Fall of Saigon.

It was, however, the history of Afghanistan repeating in rhyme. February 15, 1989 marks the day when the Soviet forces retreated from Afghanistan, having failed to impose communism on a largely tribal society.

Yet, both the US and Russia, along with new entrant China, are now actively courting the current Taliban government. The actions of the new Taliban administration may have surprised some, but the reasons behind the interest are hardly complex.

Resources trump all

The world has embarked on a global push for renewable energies, dependent on technologically complex systems.

High-capacity batteries for solar power systems and electric vehicles, along with components for energy-efficient devices, rely on one key element: Lithium.

Lithium has emerged as the preferred material due to its light weight, high energy density, and long recharge life. Lithium-polymer batteries are also used in phones, drones, and e-readers for these same reasons.

Afghanistan is believed to possess lithium reserves worth nearly US$1 trillion—entirely untapped. The demand for lithium has never been greater and is only expected to grow. Geological surveys from the 2010s hinted at the scale of Afghanistan’s wealth in this resource.

Of course, during the US-led war, when the Taliban insurgency was in full swing in Afghanistan against the invaders, and the rise of IS–Khorasan Province (IS-KP), resource extraction was impossible. Even now, as the Taliban administer Kabul, they must contend with the ongoing threat posed by IS-KP—an armed conflict that continues to claim lives and endanger civilians.

Currently, only a handful of countries mine lithium. Australia, Canada, Brazil and others cannot meet anticipated future demand. The only other country with comparable but underexploited reserves is Bolivia, though it faces its own unique complications.

What makes Afghanistan so crucial is its geographic position.

Neighbouring states such as China, Russia via the Central Asian republics, and even Iran and Pakistan, are all well-positioned to benefit. With so many regional players vying for a stake in Afghanistan’s vast mineral resources, the United States, despite its humiliating exit, cannot afford to stay away.

Washington’s interest was piqued when reports surfaced that Chinese firms were exploring Afghan lithium opportunities.

If tapped correctly, Afghanistan’s lithium reserves could not only transform the country into an economic powerhouse but also provide geopolitical leverage to whoever partners with Kabul—shaping global supply chains in their favour.

But there is more at play.

The long answer

Lithium is only part of the story. Equally significant is the Taliban’s willingness to engage with major world powers—including the US.

This shift has caught many off guard. The first Taliban government, from 1996 to 2001 under Mullah Omar, was highly insular. Only Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Pakistan recognised it formally.

This time, the Taliban seem to have learned from their earlier isolation and are actively pursuing diplomatic and economic engagement, fully aware of the strategic importance of their land and the wealth beneath it.

For China, a stable and cooperative Afghanistan offers both economic and strategic benefits. It would facilitate Chinese access to Iran and Central Asian republics like Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. While China shares a direct border with Tajikistan, it remains rugged and inaccessible.

Afghanistan’s proximity to China’s Xinjiang province is also critical. Beijing expects the Taliban to help contain the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), which has operated in Afghanistan and Syria. The Taliban are said to have taken steps to meet this expectation.

Russia’s engagement is more direct. As early as 2017, Moscow reportedly supplied arms and intelligence to the Taliban in their fight against US forces.

President Vladimir Putin has insisted on the importance of diplomatic engagement with the Taliban. When western diplomats were fleeing Kabul in August 2021, Russia kept its embassy open. The first foreign diplomat to meet the new Taliban government was Russian Ambassador Dmitry Zhirnov. Still, Russia’s influence remains relatively modest.

The principal concern for Moscow is IS-KP, which claimed the brutal Crocus City Hall attack in 2024. IS-KP has declared Russia a prime enemy due to its role in Syria and its crushing of the Chechen insurgency. Russia expects the Taliban to contain this threat. With the USSR’s failed Afghan campaign now a distant memory for most Afghans, deeper ties could emerge in time.

As for the US, it has no intention of launching a second invasion. That would be both politically suicidal and strategically disastrous.

Instead, Washington has chosen pragmatism. It now seeks limited cooperation with the Taliban, especially in light of their shared tensions with Iran. Sectarian differences and border disputes continue to sour Iran-Afghanistan ties. The Taliban’s tepid condemnation of Israeli aggression shocked much of the Muslim world, suggesting alignment—however tentative—with US regional goals.

Reinforcing this shift, US Congress has quietly passed legislation allowing humanitarian and reconstruction aid to flow into Taliban-administered Afghanistan, despite the group’s continued terrorist designation—a move that underscores Washington’s growing acceptance of Taliban governance.

Unconfirmed reports of US forces returning to Bagram Airfield earlier this year also sparked further speculation.

True or not, what matters is that the Taliban appear willing to cooperate with the US—just enough to shift the regional balance, but not enough to allow full re-entry. Lingering issues, particularly concerning former interpreters and regime loyalists, make a full rapprochement unlikely.

Still, it is clear: the Taliban now face a careful balancing act.

Geopolitical wildcard or a new playground?

The Taliban’s deliberate cooling of ties with Pakistan—their long-time backer—has sent a strong signal: they are no longer beholden to any one patron.

This has created an opening for India, which has pursued surprisingly warm diplomatic overtures toward the Taliban government. For India, this marks an expansion beyond its traditional South Asian sphere and an opportunity to apply pressure on Pakistan from multiple fronts.

For Islamabad, the Taliban’s shift is seen as betrayal. Despite Pakistan’s support for the insurgency, the new government in Kabul has adopted many of the policies of the regime it displaced. Clearly, the Taliban are unwilling to become anyone’s proxy.

It must be remembered that the Taliban are a confederation, united by a common commitment to political Islam but divided over foreign policy. A key faction enjoys close ties with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states—Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE—all of which recognised or maintained relations with the earlier Taliban government.

Today, the Persian Gulf states remain essential partners. Oman recently joined this circle after a rare IS-linked terror attack within its borders last year, prompting a reassessment of regional cooperation. The UAE’s aviation expertise has been particularly valuable in enhancing Afghanistan’s connectivity with the world.

At present, no Taliban faction appears to oppose GCC ties. However, this may change if Gulf states press the Taliban to alter some of their more controversial policies, particularly regarding women and the economy. While some dismiss this as unlikely, it remains a possibility—especially given the GCC’s sweeping domestic reforms under the guise of ESG (environmental, social, and governance) initiatives.

Afghanistan’s current diplomatic paradigm is in its infancy. Whether the Taliban can maintain their sovereignty without succumbing to internal fractures or external manipulation remains to be seen.

Still, Afghanistan now has a rare opportunity to chart a path to economic self-reliance and become indispensable on the world stage.

The game is on.


Article from

Crescent International Vol. 55, No. 5

Muharram 06, 14472025-07-01


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