Opinion

Much Is Expected Where Much Is Given

Abu Dharr

Muharram 26, 14462024-08-01

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‘Uthman, the third successor to the Prophet (pbuh), accepted his office of responsibilities while there were already governors and administrators in different parts of the Islamic territories. They were assigned their positions prior to ‘Uthman becoming the khalifah.

These were the persons in immediate command of their jurisdiction. And these were the ones ‘Uthman corresponded with as mentioned in the previous article. So, who were they?

Nafi‘ ibn ‘Abd al-Harith al-Khaza‘i was the “executive” officeholder of Makkah. It is important to note and know that he in particular as the governor of Makkah was not from Quraish. The “executive” officeholder of al-Ta’if was Sufyan ibn Abdillah al-Thaqafi and he also did not belong to Quraish. For your information, al-Ta’if was for the most part a Thaqafi tribal stronghold. Running San‘a, Yemen as its primary administrator was Ya‘la ibn Maniyah. He too was not from Quraish but was known to be on close terms with the Makkan family of Bani Nawfal ibn ‘Abd Manaf.

The governor of al-Janad region (southeast Yemen near the city of Ta‘iz) was ‘Abdullah ibn Abi Rabi‘ah who was from Quraish—the lineage of Makhzum. The governor of al-Kufah was al-Mughirah ibn Shu‘bah who hailed from Thaqif. Al-Basrah’s governor was Abu Musa al-Ash‘ari who was not a Quraishi but rather a Yemeni.

Ruling directly over Egypt was ‘Amr ibn al-‘As who was a Quraishi from the lineage of Sehm. The governor or Homs, Syria was ‘Umair ibn Sa‘d who was from the Ansar (from al-Madinah). Ruling over Damascus was Mu‘awiyah ibn Abi Sufyan who obviously was a Quraishi from the Bani Umayyah lineage. Palestine’s governor was ‘Abd al-Rahman ibn ‘Alqamah ,a Quraishi. And finally, the governor of Bahrain and its localities was ‘Uthman ibn Abi al-‘As al-Thaqafi, a non-Quraishi.

It must be noted that most of the governors were non-Quraishis and not one—not even one—was a descendent of ‘Adi which is the ancestry of ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab. Many of these governors were appointed by ‘Umar who dismissed any tribal consideration and sought out Islamic qualifications and pragmatic merits to fill those governorship posts.

During ‘Umar’s time in office, he kept scrupulous track of every move they made. Thus, ‘Umar dismissed any tribal consideration in his selection of the governors he picked or those he dismissed.

This majority non-Quraishi governor selection was very important within an overall protracted policy to distance Makkah from its past hostility to the Prophet (pbuh) and Islamic authority and then to conjoin it with al-Madinah as twin cities of a united Islamic sovereign power. Much of the problems generated by today’s sectarians are attributed to their inability to conscientiously and objectively understand this persistent Makkah vs. Madinah chapter in Islamic history.

So, when ‘Uthman assumed the duties of khilafah, he had the governors mentioned above to contend with. He also had to honor ‘Umar’s counsel and recommendation not to dismiss these governors upon his [‘Umar’s] death.

During his first year in office, ‘Uthman honored ‘Umar’s instruction and opinion by not dismissing or appointing any governor. But in other matters of state, ‘Uthman went about it in his own way.

One of the first things he did after adjudicating the affair of ‘Ubaidillah ibn ‘Umar vs. the assassins of ‘Umar and after having sent out his messages and correspondence to the governors, commanders, tax-collectors and the Muslim public was ‘Uthman’s decision to increase the amounts of money due to those who are worthy of it (in today’s idiom: social security, entitlements, disability payments, etc…). According to some accounts he doubled the amounts.

There does not seem to be an explanation for that as there was no serious economic turn of events to the worse from the day ‘Umar passed away to the day ‘Uthman decided to raise such incomes. This disbursement surge was decided by ‘Uthman within his first week(s) in office.

It may have been that ‘Uthman was inclined to compensate for ‘Umar’s austerity policies. Thus, he wanted people to feel reassured and relieved and not get the impression that an Islamic society is one of constant self-denial, unrelenting severity and cold-hearted sternness. There does not appear to be any justification for allotting extra money to the public from the treasury when the general public was not below the poverty line and when funds were needed by the state for its own “departments.”

Besides, the treasury itself was not that bulky and hefty (yet). The least that can be said here is that ‘Uthman began a procedure that to some extent deviated from ‘Umar’s approach concerning strict supervision and control of the Islamic Treasury. ‘Umar’s policy was to spend from the Treasury only when spending was an absolute necessity. ‘Uthman may have personally considered ‘Umar’s “economic model” draconian.

This new economic policy of ‘Uthman endeared him to the general public. The general public got the message: the Islamic Treasury should not be considered a possession of the khalifah. It should belong to the general public. With all this, still, ‘Uthman was not in any serious violation of Islamic guidelines—at least up until that time.

At this point there were two precedents: the precedent of ‘Umar who constricted the expenditure of the Treasury and the precedent of ‘Uthman who relaxed and loosened the expenditure of the Treasury. Little did ‘Uthman know or expect that this new open-handed economic policy of his was going to open the floodgates of luxury and lavishness that resulted in irreversible consequences.

Once the general public (at long last vastly outnumbering the Muhajireen and Ansar base) got the impression that the Khalifah had the right to freely disperse funds from the Treasury as those funds belonged to them, they began to expect more. Besides, what began as a good will gesture towards the masses turned into a laissez faire for the elite-to-be.

What used to be an economic policy of budgetary restrictions prior to ‘Uthman turned into a commercialized budget during his time in power: selfless was transfigured into selfish and socialism became individualism. This style of governance excited disproportionate competition and unfair opportunities – the race was on for wealth monopoly at the expense of the ordinary citizen and the masses of Muslims.

‘Uthman himself was very generous with his own wealth giving of it big-heartedly and open-handedly for the cause of Allah (swt). He was also known to be charitable to his family and friends. No one can find fault with that; rather may Allah (swt) reward him bountifully…

But ‘Uthman’s own wealth, considerable as it was, cannot be compared with the Islamic Treasury as ‘Uthman could not gratify the public from his own assets and possessions. So, by dipping into the Islamic Treasury to alleviate stipulations of social self-discipline he put the Islamic populace on a slippery slope of khilafah interruption.

‘Uthman wanted their convenience and it turned out to be everyone’s inconvenience. If we were equally aware of our past as we are of our present, we could easily understand the phrase: “It’s the economy, stupid.”

It is not accurate to say that ‘Uthman meticulously followed in the footsteps of his khilafah predecessors even in his first years of governance. ‘Uthman obviously broke with ‘Umar as far as Treasury and financial decisions were concerned.

People were not anxious to take issue with ‘Uthman initially as he increased their income. People are very receptive to officials who raise their standard of (a materialistic) living. People were comforted when ‘Uthman rid them of ‘Umar’s economic “puritanism”. Don’t misread ‘Umar. He was not economically meager or cheap. When it came to the economy, he was a hard taskmaster.

‘Umar’s economic strategy may be summed up by the following ayat:

And do not hold on [to the material wealth you have] in a manner that will eventually prove strangling to you and [likewise] do not have a squandering hand for you will end up being blamed [for your wastefulness] and you will regret it - Al-Isra’: 29.

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