Ahmed Makhmoudov
All politics is, first and foremost, local. Political developments in Azerbaijan are frequently viewed through the prism of geopolitics, international rivalries, and relations between regional powers. Although these factors are important, they cannot explain the country’s internal political dynamics entirely.
The controversy surrounding the hijab ban in Azerbaijani schools must first be understood through the relationship between the Aliyev regime and the broader society, particularly the growing significance of Islam, suppression of independent political forces, and the regime’s perception of its own strength.
External developments matter because they influence the regime’s calculations, but the central question is domestic. Why does the regime believe that the present moment is favourable for confronting the Islamic movement?
The current restrictions are part of a longer history. The Aliyev regime attempted to introduce a long-ago planned hijab ban in public schools around 2010 but encountered significant political resistance.
In October 2013, citizens marched peacefully towards the Ministry of Education in Baku to demand cancellation of the ban. Regime’s forces attacked the demonstrators, and, as the confrontation unfolded, citizens exercised their right to self-defence.
This response received considerable applause for the Islamic movement among different segments of Azerbaijani society. The regime ultimately had to back down.
The episode demonstrated that, despite its coercive power, the regime could not disregard the internal social and political consequences of its policies. The circumstances today, however, are different, and the regime appears to believe that the balance of power has shifted decisively in its favour.
Regime Convinced of Its Own Strength
The Aliyev regime’s present confidence rests first and foremost on the systematic weakening of its domestic opponents. Through police crackdowns, torture, arrests, and restrictions on independent political activity, the Aliyev regime has severely diminished the capacity of many opposition groups to challenge its despotism.
The political landscape that existed when the hijab issue first erupted has changed considerably. The regime no longer faces the same level of intensity of domestic opposition and it may believe that the Islamic movement is now the last significant mass popular force capable of mobilising society independently of state control.
The liberation of Karabakh from Armenian nationalist militias has further strengthened this perception. For years, the unresolved conflict was a significant political vulnerability for the regime. The victory transformed this domestic political equation. Having achieved an objective that had dominated Azerbaijani national life for decades, the regime now approaches its remaining internal opponents with much greater confidence.
Aliyev believes that the removal of this vulnerability gives him greater freedom to pursue policies against groups he considers a challenge to his political dominance.
Yet the same Karabakh war also exposed a contradiction in the regime’s position. During the conflict, Islamic expressions became increasingly visible among Azerbaijani soldiers and volunteers. Images of soldiers praying, invoking the Imams of the Ahlul Bayt, and interpreting their struggle through Islamic traditions circulated widely.
Islam became a source of social mobilisation at a moment when the regime was seeking to consolidate national unity around the war. Such mobilisation benefited the regime, but the increased public visibility of Islam also strengthened the social significance of religious identity that the state has long attempted to keep under its control.
Islamic Movement as the Main Domestic Challenge
Since independence, the Aliyev-ruled regime has presented itself as the guardian of a secular state, often portraying the growth of independent religious activity as a threat to the country’s political direction. Suppression of Islamic activists, restrictions on religious organisations, and imprisonment of prominent religious figures have been part of this long confrontation.
Following the 2015 crackdown on the Muslim Unity Movement and the imprisonment of its leadership, the authorities also sought to cultivate religious figures and institutions more closely aligned with the state. This strategy has had some success, but it has not eliminated the influence of independent Islamic movements.
Islamic leaders such as Taleh Baqirzade and Abgul Suleymanov have continued to command wide respect among Azerbaijani society despite imprisonment.
As soon as the society began voicing its opposition to the recent hijab ban enforcement, the regime immediately re-arrested Sheikh Abgul Suleymanov after he made his opposition public on social media.
The regime’s domestic success may also be its greatest vulnerability. Its attempt to replicate the methods used against others to suppress Azerbaijan’s Islamic movement is backfiring socially, generating a reaction that could undermine the very control it seeks to consolidate.
Although, the Islamic movement in Azerbaijan lacks serious administrative, financial and organizational capabilities, it’s a movement, not an organization similar to the ones the regime supressed or co-opted. It functions outside of the paradigm the regime is accustomed to.
The protests have involved not only hijab-wearing girls and their parents, but also other students who have expressed solidarity with them. In several places, girls prevented from entering classrooms have continued gathering outside school buildings, with lessons reportedly conducted at school gates.
The significance of these developments extends beyond the immediate dispute over school uniforms. They demonstrate that the ability to suppress organised opposition groups did not necessarily translate into the subjugation of the Islamic movement and the wider society.
A movement whose leaders and organisations have been targeted can retain social connections, credibility, and the capacity to inspire solidarity. By attempting to subdue this remaining independent force, the regime may be opening a confrontation whose consequences extend well beyond the question of hijab and secularism.
Why the External Environment Matters
Although domestic dynamics are central, the regime’s calculations cannot be separated entirely from Azerbaijan’s external relationships. Its ties with Russia, Iran, and Turkiye affect the political environment in which it operates and its assessment of the possible costs of confronting the Islamic movement.
Russia remains the most crucial regional power and a supporter of the despotic regimes across throughout the former Soviet Union.
The Aliyev regime’s relationship with Moscow provides an important strategic dimension to its calculations. Russia’s ability to earn foreign currency by masking its energy products and selling them to Europe through the Aliyev regime is just one of the key strategic bonds between Baku and Moscow.
Russia’s large Azerbaijani diaspora, estimated at over a million people, including many practising Muslims, could also be a source of pressure on Aliyev. However, Moscow’s close ties with the Aliyev regime and its control over the political space available to diaspora activists help limit the potential for this community to become an independent force influencing Azerbaijan’s domestic affairs, further easing the pressure on the regime.
From the perspective of the Aliyev regime, close relations with Moscow provide strategic security and greater room for manoeuvre in domestic affairs. The government may believe that it can pursue confrontation with independent Islamic movements without facing strong pressure from Russia.
In this interpretation, its relationship with Moscow is not merely a matter of foreign policy; it forms part of the wider environment that influences the regime’s perception of its own security.
Iran presents a different dimension. The regime is calculating that Tehran’s preoccupation with regional confrontation limits its ability or willingness to intervene in defence of Islamic movements in Azerbaijan. Aliyev also correctly assesses that Iran would be reluctant to jeopardise its relationship with Russia by becoming directly involved in Azerbaijan’s internal affairs. Such calculations encourage the regime to believe that the present moment offers an opportunity to intensify pressure on the Islamic movement in Azerbaijan.
Turkiye, meanwhile, remains an important regional actor with deep political, military, and cultural ties to Azerbaijan. Nevertheless, the Aliyev regime may believe that its relationship with Russia gives it sufficient strategic backing to withstand Turkish displeasure. It may therefore calculate that Ankara’s influence, while important, does not impose an insurmountable obstacle to a domestic campaign against the Islamic movement.
These external considerations reinforce the central argument rather than replace it. The regime’s calculations concerning Russia, Iran, and Turkiye matter because of how they shape its assessment of the risks associated with domestic repression. The decisive issue remains what the leadership believes it can accomplish inside Azerbaijan.
The Limits of Regime’s Calculations
The regime may nevertheless have underestimated the changes taking place within Azerbaijani society. Over the past decade, the number of practising Muslims has increased, while Islam has become more visible in social and public life.
Although Azerbaijan remains distinct from many other Muslim-majority societies in the extent of religious practice, the assumption that religion can be confined to a marginal or tightly controlled role has become increasingly difficult to sustain.
Equally important is the attitude of the secular segment of society. In Azerbaijan being non-religious does not necessarily mean being hostile to Islam. Many secular Azerbaijanis maintain deep respect for religion and regard it as an important part of the country’s historical and cultural identity. They may not support an Islamic political system or agree with the positions of particular religious movements, but they can still oppose state restrictions on religious expression.
This distinction helps explain why the hijab ban has generated opposition beyond the practising Muslim community. The issue is not simply whether a particular religious practice should be permitted in schools. It is also whether the regime should prevent girls from receiving an education because of their clothing.
The regime may have expected that restrictions would isolate the Islamic movement further. Instead, the policy has created a point of convergence between practising Muslims and secular citizens who object to the exclusion of students from school. This is the central way in which the ban may be backfiring: an attempt to weaken one independent social force has produced a grievance that resonates with a wider part of society.
The experience of 2013 is relevant here. The earlier confrontation demonstrated that the hijab issue could mobilise people beyond the immediate circle of religious activists. The current situation unfolds under different political conditions, after years of repression and the victory in Karabakh. Yet the underlying social question remains: how far can the state go in restricting religious expression without generating resistance among people who otherwise have little in common politically?
The Struggle Is Only Just Beginning
The Aliyev regime may feel that it has reached its strongest domestic position in years. Formal opposition has been weakened, the victory in Karabakh has strengthened the regime’s standing and the external environment may appear favourable to a renewed campaign against the Islamic movement. From this perspective, the hijab restrictions represent an attempt to subdue what the regime may regard as the last significant source of popular mobilisation beyond its control.
But political strength does not guarantee that every confrontation will produce the intended outcome. The growth of religious commitment, respect for Islam among secular citizens, and the ability of a specific grievance to unite different segments of society all complicate the regime’s calculations.
The struggle over hijab in Azerbaijan is therefore about more than school uniforms. It concerns the relationship between the state and society, the place of Islam in Azerbaijani public life, and the limits of the regime’s ability to control independent social forces.
The regime may attempt to contain the protests through repression or by easing the enforcement of restrictions. How the confrontation unfolds remains uncertain.
What is clear, however, is that the domestic dimension must remain at the centre of any serious analysis. Geopolitics influences the environment in which the Aliyev regime operates, but the roots of the present confrontation lie in Azerbaijan’s internal political history and the changing place of Islam in society. The ongoing struggle is not the beginning, neither it is an end. It is simply a manifestation of a different phase.
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