Abu Dharr
Within the covert and fluctuating relationship between a well-established Islamic capital of al-Madinah and a hitherto well-established mushrik capital of Makkah we cannot emphasize enough that the Prophet (pbuh) defined the people of Makkah, who fought a cold war and a hot war against him and the committed Muslims for over twenty years, as الطلقاء [amnestied combatants]. He (pbuh) did not identify them as “sahabah” [companions] as the Umayyad dynasty would later retroactively classify them—a classification that disruptively and contentiously lives on until today.
One may further add that that classification contributes to the sectarian schisms that we are suffering from nowadays. There may have been some Makkan individuals who truly wanted to prove their sincere adherence to Allah (swt) and His Prophet (pbuh) after the liberation of Makkah but we would be amiss if we were to think that instantly, the entire hitherto hostile population of Makkah became genuinely and truthfully committed Muslims after over 20 long years of animosity and bad blood towards the Prophet (pbuh), his kindred spirits, the Muhajireen and the Ansar.
One example that demonstrates the irregularity and patchiness between the solid Muslims of al-Madinah and the vainglorious Muslims of a latter-day militarily defeated Makkah was the incident in which Khalid ibn al-Walid accompanied and attended the corpse of ‘Ikrimah ibn Abi Jahl to al-Madinah as the latter became a last-ditch martyr fighting against external enemies. Both Khalid and ‘Ikrimah were late comers to Islam. Khalid in the eighth year of the Hijrah—after Sulh al-Hudaybiyah and before the liberation of Makkah and ‘Ikrimah during the eighth year of the Hijrah according to some sources.
Other sources say that it was after the liberation of Makkah. So, when Khalid accompanied ‘Ikrimah’s corpse back to Makkah, Khalid placed ‘Ikrimah’s head on his knee, looked at him and said: زعم ابن حنتمة أننا لا نستشهد! [The son of Hantamah [Hantamah is the name of ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab’s mother] claims that we [the erstwhile Makkan mushriks will never become martyrs]. From this statement one can sense the friction between earlier committed Muslims and latter-day belated Muslims by the words of Khalid: “the son of Hantamah” as he avoided using the name and the title of ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab.
Accordingly, ‘Umar was diligent and stringent when it came to administering Quraish and Makkah as he knew their makeup and mindset well. ‘Umar was not lenient even with Makkan Quraishis who were rich when they became Muslims, even though they were among the first to follow the Prophet (pbuh). Case in point, ‘Abd al-Rahman ibn ‘Awf (one of the Sabiqeen [earliest] committed Muslims) who because of a medical condition was permitted by the Prophet (pbuh) to wear silk. One day ‘Abd al-Rahman ibn ‘Awf in the company of his son who is wearing a shirt of silk came upon ‘Umar.
‘Umar spotted that infraction and asked: What is this? Then ‘Umar placed his hand in the son’s silk shirt pocket and tore it. ‘Abd al-Rahman said to ‘Umar: do you not know that the Messenger of Allah allowed me to wear silk? ‘Umar answered: Yes! And that is because of a health condition you complained about. But as for your children never, that exemption does not apply [to them].
‘Umar kept a watchful eye over the Muhajireen lest they take advantage of their status. He took issue with Mu‘awiyah who anxiously wanted to have a fleet of ships and sail the high seas. My humble understanding of this ‘Umari objection to Mu‘awiyah, the governor of al-Sham [the Levant], was ‘Umar’s wariness of heedless Quraishi adventures that would end up in a form of alliance or surrender to the Byzantines who were more prepared and equipped than the desert Arabians for maritime warfare.
During Abu Bakr’s reign, Quraish thought they could break loose from al-Madinah because it seemed to them was it fighting a defensive war against those titular Arabian Muslims who wanted to break away from al-Madinah. For a couple of years before ‘Umar came to power, Quraish reckoned it was making a comeback to its pre-Islamic upper-class standing and superiority status.
‘Umar could see through all this and would have none of it. If it wasn’t for centuries of sectarianism that have personified a clash between ‘Umar and Imam ‘Ali, we could easily say that ‘Umar was Imam ‘Ali in disguise. Another way of expressing this is to say that ‘Umar was conducting himself the same way Imam ‘Ali would have conducted himself towards Quraish and Makkah were it not for the backlash of ‘asabiyah.
Then we had ‘Uthman trying to manage this Madinah-to-Makkah divergence and contrast. ‘Uthman could either continue the strict and rigid policies of ‘Umar and continue to clamp down on the Muhajireen’s movements and restrict them to al-Madinah. He would thereby appear to the public to be like ‘Umar: suspicious of Quraish, its geography and mentality—no partiality and no preferential treatment… or ‘Uthman could choose to relax this whole social and legal atmosphere and thereby tolerate and thus make possible for Quraish to pursue its anonymous intention for hegemony.
We will discover that ‘Uthman chose the latter with mixed feelings—in a sense he was persuaded and, in another sense, he was compelled. As the surreptitious tug of war between al-Madinah and Makkah—the former solidly Islamic, the latter sporadically Islamic—gained momentum it fell upon ‘Uthman to play out the “carrot” approach to Makkah. We have to remind ourselves that ‘Uthman was the son-in-law of the Prophet (pbuh) and the brother-in-law of Imam ‘Ali on one hand but he was also an Umawiy.
Another central and critical population base that ‘Uthman had to pay close attention to was al-Ansar. They are well known to all Muslims, or at least they should be. Allah (swt) has mentioned them with honor in the Qur’an, the Prophet’s achievement of an independent Islamic territorial homeland is mostly attributed to them. With all that, we realize that none of them ever occupied the highest office of authority. Some Muslim historians and authors trace this back to Abu Bakr when he said that the Prophet (pbuh) stated: الامامة في قريش [leadership hails from Quraish]. After that Abu Bakr spoke to the Ansar and said: نحن الأمراء وأنتم الوزراء [We—the Muhajireen—are the executives and you—the Ansar—are the commissioners].
Both Abu Bakr and ‘Umar would frantically, eagerly and earnestly seek the input and involvement of the Ansar along with the Muhajireen. ‘Uthman, more or less, did the same. But during ‘Uthman’s time in office a new generation came of age—a generation (sons and daughters of the Muhajireen and Ansar) who were technically not Muhajireen or Ansar. ‘Umar was bold enough to bypass Quraish when appointing administrators and governors and select whoever was qualified from the Islamic general public—especially from the Ansar. And had ‘Umar lived on for some more years, he may have solidly integrated the Ansar into the upper echelons of the State.
The Ansar dealt with both Abu Bakr and ‘Umar in good faith and sound intentions. Some Ansar and especially the younger generation from among them began to show warning signs concerning what was becoming a “bloated Quraishi peers of the realm.”
The recent past was still alive: it was primarily the Ansar who defeated Quraish at Badr and the Ansar finally managed with the leadership of the Prophet (pbuh) alongside the Muhajireen to militarily liberate Makkah after many years of sacrifices and martyrs. The Ansar could see, feel, and sense how ‘Umar was severe and strict with Quraish and accurately thought that justice is being done.
But when ‘Uthman became the Khalifah, the Ansar would evaluate him in the way he handled Quraish. If ‘Uthman continued the strict and exacting policies of ‘Umar, the Ansar would have no qualms as equality would rule the day. But if ‘Uthman began to show preferential treatment toward Quraish, then the Ansar public opinion would understand that it was partiality or even prejudice. In today’s language the Ansar would feel like they are “second class citizens.”
As we will see, ‘Uthman did give preference to Quraish—not to purposely alienate the Ansar but to decisively win over Makkah. This ‘Uthmani policy of assuaging Makkah/Quraish was very painful, agonizing, and awful to the Ansar which would swell into the making of the well-known Fitnah [الفتنة الكبرى] which set into motion the sequence of civil strife developments that followed.
And as for the first and foremost of the Muhajireen and the Ansar as well as those who follow them by way of [seeking] accomplishment – Allah is well-pleased with them, and well-pleased are they with Him. And for them has He readied gardens through which running waters flow, therein to abide beyond the count of time: this [goal] is the triumph supreme! - Al-Tawbah, 100.
The Islamic system of governance as exemplified by the Prophet (pbuh) and his two successors should not be confused with the western concept...
The persons around the Prophet (pbuh) were the founding fathers of Islamic self-determination. While not all of the same ranking, they were ...
When the Prophet (pbuh) left this earthly abode, the vast majority of Muslims were newcomers to Islam, hence not fully immersed in the value...
The third Khalifah, Uthman’s deviation from the policy established by the Prophet and his two successors (Abu Bakr and ‘Umar) by apporti...
