Abu Dharr
As we have previously pointed out, during his Khilafah, ‘Uthman generously opened up the treasure chest for those that he felt needed more financial assistance. In addition to that and for the first time, ‘Uthman requested distant jurisdictions to send to al-Madinah categories of citizens who were deemed to be in need for the purpose of obtaining necessary financial assistance.
This amounted to a policy not known in previous years of Islamic fiscal administration – certainly not during ‘Umar’s period in office. True, ‘Umar had allocated a certain disbursement to the residents of al-Madinah: one dirham after dirham during the days of fasting, and to the wives of the Prophet (pbuh) two dirhams so that they and their families would not feel deprived. ‘Umar regarded that as being better than to have public repasts or communal meals.
He may have thought that this would better serve their exceptional status and it would give them more freedom of choice to take private care of their dependents. So, when ‘Uthman took over he, too, kept the “diet disbursement” during the month of fasting but in addition to that he offered those who were poor, free access to “ceremonial dinners” or what some people would call today “soup kitchens”, “food pantries” or “shepherd’s table”.
This gesture towards the underprivileged in society is and should be welcomed by any reasonable person. The flipside to this is that some people begin to covet and desire to individually possess public monies and reserves while others may be tempted and prompted to “qualify” for financial assistance when in reality they do not qualify. Not all people can withhold themselves from “free food”.
Similarly, not everyone can distinguish between a person experiencing fleeting hunger and someone suffering from lasting hunger, or between marginal deprivation and chronic deprivation. Nor can everyone police who really is in need and who is not.
Free access to nourishment is meant for those who are starving and scraggy and not for those who are “healthy-hungry”. Many people have no qualms about adding to their financial assistance and Ramadan assistance a free meal when that meal is meant for someone who is consistently in need and regularly wanting. Another way of looking at this is that ‘Uthman’s goodwill economic gesture centralized al-Madinah more than necessary and decentralized the far-flung regions more than necessary.
These subtle psychological dynamics were in “a tug of war” between the altruistic generation of the Prophet (pbuh) – the Muhajireen and the Ansar in particular who had by and large proven their selflessness on one side and the recent Muslim beginners who had yet to prove their selflessness.
‘Uthman’s openhanded financial course of action was meant to serve the deprived general public but it carried with it considerable political and ethical risks. Some people may have interpreted this as favoritism because Muslims are all supposed to be equal – whether they were living in al-Madinah or living a thousand miles away, and whether they have been Muslims for a couple of easy months or they have been Muslims for a couple of tense and difficult decades… Furthermore, some may get the idea that ‘Uthman’s munificence was meant to win over public opinion and favorable recognition!
From here on, ‘Uthman’s formal bounteousness becomes difficult to defend and plausibly problematic. Why? Because as the months and years went by, ‘Uthman began to hand out from the Islamic state funds amounts of money to luminary companions of the Prophet (pbuh) in addition to what they received from budgetary state allocations.
According to information noted by Ibn Sa‘d, ‘Uthman gave al-Zubair ibn al-‘Awwam )a cousin of both the Prophet (pbuh) and Imam ‘Ali, i.e. the son of the Prophet’s and Imam ‘Ali’s paternal aunt Safiyah bint ‘Abd al-Muttalib, who became a committed Muslim at the age of sixteen) 600,000 dirhams. He also gave Talhah ibn ‘Ubaidillah (another renowned companion who was one of the first ten to dedicate themselves to Allah (swt) and the Prophet (pbuh)) 200,000 dirhams and wrote off some debt that Talhah owed ‘Uthman.
It is also recorded by Ibn Sa‘d that when al-Zubair received his hundreds of thousands, he began asking about where and what is the best way to invest such money. The answer he felt comfortable with was to invest in “real estate” and property acquisition in cosmopolitan regions.
‘Uthman went further than that in earnestly parting with the general ascetic guiding principles of ‘Umar when he permitted the “high ranking” companions of the Prophet (pbuh) to leave or, as some would say, “to quit” al-Madinah and go wherever they wanted to go beyond al-Hijaz. It should be noted that ‘Umar had restricted their freedom of movement and constricted them to al-Madinah unless they gained specific authorization to leave. ‘Umar’s quarantine of the high-ranking companions of the Prophet (pbuh) should be understood in light of the unsettled relationship between al-Madinah and Makkah as some of these companions may compromise more than is necessary to “win over” Makkah.
It needs repeating that Makkah was militarily liberated but it still carried the memory of decades of hostilities and warfare against the Prophet (pbuh). In the judgment of ‘Umar, Imam ‘Ali, al-Muhajireen, and al-Ansar, now was not the time for some “freelance” companions to compromise principles for profits or austerity for affluence. Thus, he barred the prominent companions from “using their honorable status” to attenuate the Islamic command and control center of al-Madinah.
‘Umar may have also saved these decent companions from their own selves. If they were to leave al-Madinah, they may have become idolized celebrities… Satan is lodged in the ego…
‘Umar made it very clear that he would not give Quraish [Makkah] the chance to come back at al-Madinah and create an internal fitnah by what could become “sahabah fifth columnists”.
So now we have ‘Uthman who became the khalifah with a popular mandate coached by optimism, aspiration, and hopefulness to bring Makkah fully into line with al-Madinah. He tried his best, as he saw it, to do so by what we may nowadays call “liberal” policies: large payouts, substantial endowments, and no travel restrictions. This resulted in some of the Muhajireen and Ansar “linking up” with powerful Islamic armies and overpowered populations. This trusting policy of ‘Uthman gave rise to what we may call “power centers”.
This was the beginning of the emergence of “Islamic interest groups”, “Islamic political parties”, and “Islamic splinter groups.” None of this was intended or planned by ‘Uthman.
When we read ‘Uthman’s letters to the governors, administrators, and the Muslim public, they put everyone on notice of the danger that comes from the combination of money and power. The khilafah incremental strategy of combining Makkah with al-Madinah brought with it the creeping trouble of coupling wealth with entitlement. It does not appear to this writer that ‘Uthman was “playing politics” or that he thought he was seriously contradicting the Prophet (pbuh) or Abu Bakr and ‘Umar.
‘Uthman did not have an agenda of one-sidedness that would tip the balance against al-Madinah in favor of Makkah (Quraish) even though that is what would “play out” as the years went by. His seemingly innocent gratuity towards some veteran and honorable Muhajireen who were the hope of bridging the gap between al-Madinah and Makkah would in the long term gradually erode the authority and effectiveness of al-Madinah in the years to come.
From ‘Uthman’s point of view, he expected the proven goodwill of al-Madinah to outshine the lingering ill-will of Makkah. It appears that public opinion of al-Muhajireen and the Ansar knowing what they had to endure from two decades of a “state of war” with Makkah, gave ‘Uthman the benefit of the doubt – especially as they now became recipients of plentiful treasury funds.
This widely held “benefit of the doubt” continued for roughly the first half of ‘Uthman’s reign in the context of a common understanding that it would eventually be possible to socially and mentally integrate Makkah with al-Madinah.
But as for [the attitude of] social humans [man], whenever his Sustainer puts him through trying times and honors him with bounties and provisions, he says, “My Sustainer has honored me!” --- But, then, whenever He puts him through trying times and supplies him sparingly with resources [and livelihood], he says, “My Sustainer has demeaned me!” Absolutely not! Rather, you [as societies] do not bestow honor [and generosity] upon the orphan [in society], and you are not motivated in a collective corroborative way to feed the dispossessed, and you gobble down [in crass consumption what is your] gross estate, And you love money [and wealth] with infatuated affection! - Al-Fajr: 15-20.
The Islamic system of governance as exemplified by the Prophet (pbuh) and his two successors should not be confused with the western concept...
The persons around the Prophet (pbuh) were the founding fathers of Islamic self-determination. While not all of the same ranking, they were ...
When the Prophet (pbuh) left this earthly abode, the vast majority of Muslims were newcomers to Islam, hence not fully immersed in the value...
The third Khalifah, Uthman’s deviation from the policy established by the Prophet and his two successors (Abu Bakr and ‘Umar) by apporti...
