Mohamed Ousman
The Pact, signed by Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan in August 2026, establishes collective defence and cooperation in intelligence, military planning and defence capabilities. Attack on one member is treated as attack on all, but the agreement does not explicitly designate Israel as adversary or mandate territorial recovery.
Saudi Ownership of the Gulf of Eilat
The Gulf of Eilat, commonly called the Gulf of Aqaba, is a northern extension of the Red Sea bordered by Egypt, illegitimate Israel, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Saudi territorial claim concerns Tiran and Sanafir, two islands at the Gulf of Aqaba’s entrance. The islands’ security arrangements and navigation rights remain strategically significant. Israel occupied the islands during the 1956 and 1967 wars, but no mention is ever made that Israel occupies “Saudi Arabian” sovereign territory.
The islands have a documented history involving Saudi sovereignty claims and Egyptian administration. It also includes a sliver of land that Israel currently occupies which is technically “Saudi” territory. While Egypt administered the islands, a 2016 maritime agreement recognised their transfer to Saudi sovereignty. Egyptian courts contested the agreement before its eventual approval.
That Saudi Arabia dubiously transferred Tiran and Sanafir to Egypt to avoid being a frontline state against Israel is classified information and not established by available evidence. Arabian official history instead describes Egyptian administration and a 2016 agreement transferring sovereignty to Saudi Arabia.
Imam Muhammad Al-Asi’s Qur’anic framework and the failure of collective defence
Al-Asi’s Qur’anic framework begins with a fundamental question: do Muslim governments demonstrate the justice, independence and public responsibility that Islamic legitimacy requires? He argues that some rulers protect their own authority through alliances with powerful external states while suppressing criticism from Muslim scholars and political movements. He describes this as an “islamization of the rulers” operation through which religious credentials are used to legitimise political conduct that contradicts Qur’anic principles (The Ascendant Qur’an: Realigning Man to the Divine Power Culture. Vols. 1-12. ICIT (2008-2024)).
Al-Asi’s critique distinguishes religious identity from the actual exercise of political power. A government may invoke Islam, host religious institutions and employ religious scholars while pursuing policies that remain open to serious ethical criticism.
Al-Asi criticises political arrangements that perpetuate injustice. The broader Qur’anic principle is explicit: committed Muslims must uphold justice even when doing so challenges their own interests.
This argument offers a framework for examining why a collective defence agreement might fail to address Palestine or territorial disputes around the Gulf of Aqaba. The relevant question is not simply whether Muslim governments possess armies or sign treaties, but whether their strategic priorities reflect justice, public accountability and the protection of the Ummah.
Applied to the Pact, this raises the question of whether Islamic solidarity is expressed through substantive commitments or diplomatic symbolism. The agreement signed by Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan establishes a collective-defence framework, but its public description does not explicitly identify Israel as an adversary or require military action to recover Tiran and Sanafir.
From Al-Asi’s perspective, this invites scrutiny of the priorities shaping the agreement. Why is collective defence organised around a vague commitment to respond to attacks rather than explicitly addressing Palestinian self-determination, civilian protection and unresolved Israeli territorial expansion?
Their conduct invites questions pertaining to insincerity or secret subordination to foreign powers. These political arrangements evidence how signatory states negotiate security agreements according to national interests, perceived threats, military capabilities and diplomatic constraints.
The Qur’an commands committed Muslims to stand firmly for justice and prohibits hatred from becoming a reason for injustice. These principles are especially important when analysing the Islamic Iran-led Resistance against US-Israeli military aggression.
The Qur’an prohibits transgression in fighting while establishing a framework for peace and reconciliation. Consequently, a defensible Islamic security policy must combine the protection of legitimate rights, civilian protection, lawful conduct and serious efforts to prevent further violence.
This distinction challenges the political passivity of the signatory regimes who may condemn injustice by the US and Israel rhetorically but refuse to use available economic or military measures.
The Pact should be assessed by measurable outcomes: whether its signatories coordinate humanitarian protection, strengthen defensive capabilities and support credible political solutions. Its value diminishes by its inability to respond to US-Israel aggression.
One of the strongest arguments by Al-Asi is his insistence that Muslim governments must be willing to examine their mistakes. He argues that governments frequently make excuses instead of correcting political failures.
This observation can be applied to the long-standing fragmentation of regional security arrangements. Arabian regimes differ in their relations with Washington, their approaches to Israel, their assessments of Islamic Iran and their domestic political priorities. These differences make a unified strategy difficult, not to mention when governments look askance at Palestinian suffering.
The historical record of Tiran and Sanafir illustrates why precision matters. Egypt administered the islands and the 2016 agreement concerned their transfer to Saudi sovereignty. Israel occupied them during earlier Arabian-Israeli wars yet the documented history ignores how Israel currently occupies them as “Saudi Arabian territory”.
If Muslim political analysis begins with an inaccurate claim, it risks directing public anger toward a mistaken diagnosis. Self-criticism must therefore include rigorous historical research and criticism of the signatory governments for their inability to designate Saudi Arabia as a frontline state in relation to Israeli occupation.
What a Qur’anic security strategy requires
A constructive application of Al-Asi’s framework would demand transparency in defence agreements, public accountability, cooperation across nationally imposed borders and an explicit commitment to justice. It would also integrate the rights of the people of Palestine with the Gulf of Aqaba.
The failure to create a pact specifically directed at recovering the islands is proof that Saudi Arabia deliberately surrendered occupied territory to avoid confronting Israel. The stronger argument is that signatory governments have not necessarily translated their shared ethical commitments into a coherent, publicly accountable programme for resolving Palestinian and other territorial disputes.
Ultimately, the Qur’anic test is not whether an alliance adopts the correct religious vocabulary. It is whether its policies advance justice, prevent oppression, protect human life and remain accountable to the principles it claims to uphold.
Imam Zafar Bangash’s Seerah framework and the Covenant of Madinah
Bangash’s approach to the Seerah emphasises the Prophet Muhammad’s leadership as a source of guidance for Muslim political organisation, collective responsibility and the development of an independent community. Applied to the Pact, this framework invites comparison with the Covenant of Madinah, which organised relations among the early Muslim community and other parties in Madinah through specified obligations, mutual responsibilities and arrangements for collective security (Power Manifestations of the Sirah: ICIT, Toronto 2011).
The Covenant offers a useful contrast with alliances that possess military capabilities but lack an agreed political purpose. Its relevance lies in examining how a state establishes commitments, resolves disputes and defines responsibilities towards the Ummah and partners.
From this perspective, the principal weakness of the pact would be an absence of clarity about the injustices it intends to address, the conditions under which member states assist one another, and the political and humanitarian objectives that guide collective action. A credible agreement needs more than declarations of solidarity: it needs consultation, dependable institutions, shared planning and mechanisms for resolving disagreements.
Although the Covenant of Madinah was not a military treaty directed against Bani Israel, it establishes a contemporary responsibility on Muslims to initiate responsible leadership and defense in accordance with the principles of lawful cooperation against US-Israeli aggression.
The Pact signed in August 2026 establishes a contemporary collective-defence framework, but it does not expressly mandate the recovery of Tiran and Sanafir or identify Israel as the designated adversary.
A Bangash-inspired assessment would therefore ask whether the alliance can develop sufficient trust, strategic coordination and moral purpose to protect the Ummah. Its success should be judged by its ability to uphold sovereignty, support Palestinian rights, protect civilians and pursue justice through coordinated and accountable action.
Dr. Kalim Siddiqui’s Islamic Movement Theory: fragmentation and strategic failure
Siddiqui’s Islamic Movement Theory provides a structural explanation for why Muslim governments may fail to develop a unified political response to Palestine or other regional disputes. Siddiqui challenges the assumption that existing Muslim-majority states necessarily represent the political unity of the Ummah. He argues that the Islamic movement must be understood as a wider historical and political process rather than as a collection of disconnected national organisations (Bangash, Zafar (ed): In Pursuit of the Power of Islam: Major Writings of Kalim Siddiqui. Open Press, Toronto (1996) and: Siddiqui, Kalim: Stages of Islamic Revolution, Open Press, London (1996)).
Applied to the Pact, his perspective shifts attention from the absence of a single anti-Israel military declaration to the political structures that determine collective action. Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan possess different strategic national interests, domestic priorities and international relationships. The Pact loses legitimacy when defence cooperation lacks a shared programme for Palestine, regional territorial disputes or the transformation of the wider Muslim political order.
Siddiqui’s framework would interpret this gap as a problem of political integration. Diplomatic declarations cannot overcome structural fragmentation unless institutions establish shared priorities, independent analysis, strategic coordination and sustained public accountability. A defence pact is not equivalent to a unified Islamic political project.
This critique also challenges the assumption that military confrontation alone demonstrates Islamic political commitment. An effective movement must develop intellectual, organisational and institutional capacities capable of translating ethical principles into durable political outcomes. Siddiqui’s work emphasises the development of alternative political thought and the need to examine the existing nation-state system critically.
Siddiqui’s central question is therefore whether contemporary alliances can overcome fragmented political priorities and develop a coherent programme of justice, sovereignty and Palestinian self-determination. The Pact provides an institutional starting point, but its wider political significance depends on the objectives its members actually pursue. The Pact exists, but its existence alone does not guarantee a unified strategy for Palestine or other territorial questions.
A credible Islamic political programme would combine historical accuracy, protection of civilians, accountability, Palestinian self-determination, lawful defence and sustained diplomatic action. That is a more rigorous standard by which to evaluate Muslim governments and collective-security agreements.
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