Abu Dharr
The third successor to the Prophet (pbuh) was honorable in his efficient sacking of al-Walid ibn ‘Uqbah ibn Abi Mu‘it as well as in his conscious implementation of al-Hadd [the Islamic legal punishment] due upon the offender, al-Walid. ‘Uthman, though, after sacking al-Walid should have appointed a qualified committed Muslim from the Muhajireen or al-Ansar to govern al-Kufah.
Had he done that, the population of al-Kufah, in all likelihood, would have been spared the divisions and bad feelings that ensued. What ‘Uthman did was that he fired a person from Aal Abi Mu‘it as governor of al-Kufah and replaced him with a person from Bani Umayyah. ‘Uthman contravened ‘Umar’s advice: not to have anyone from Aal Abi Mu‘it nor from Bani Umayyah reach high positions of power and authority in the Islamic government. The people of al-Kufah were almost certainly aware of ‘Umar’s recommendation to both Imam ‘Ali and to ‘Uthman.
The inhabitants of al-Kufah were knowledgeable of the Prophet’s true and tried companions from the Muhajireen and the Ansar who they would have favored to become their governor. ‘Uthman was aware that the people of al-Kufah were dissatisfied with al-Walid after he took over from Sa‘d ibn Abi Waqqas with whom they were pleased. With hindsight, ‘Uthman would have been better off sending someone comparable to Sa‘d and not someone similar to al-Walid.
Sa‘id ibn al-‘As was a young man from the Umayyah clan seemingly moderate, measured and modest. He had an honorable military record as he served in the liberation of al-Sham [geographical Syria] as was the case with other individuals from his Umayyah relatives.
Before becoming the Khalifah, ‘Uthman was in a sense Sa‘id’s guardian. ‘Umar, during his time in office, inquired about the condition of Sa‘id who was at that time in the company of Mu‘awiyah in al-Sham, and was told that Sa‘id was critically ill. ‘Umar instructed Mu‘awiyah to send him to al-Madinah where he rapidly recovered and regained his health and vitality.
‘Umar had a “soft heart” for Sa‘id in as far as he had him get married and benefit from the company of Quraish’s younger generation—the generation that did not fight against the Prophet (pbuh) and his companions. Still, Sa‘id was a Quraishi and an Umawiy who felt an affinity and kinship with ‘Uthman and his clan.
Sa‘id was straight and sincere, no doubt. His weakness was his identification and general fellow feeling for Quraish and especially towards the Umayyah branch among them. When assuming the governorship of al-Kufah he was intent on reversing the damage of his predecessor al-Walid.
It appears that upon arrival in al-Kufah Sa‘id was welcomed and he, in his first year(s), governed in a fair and evenhanded manner. He showed personal interest in the everyday affairs of his townspeople; he chose his specific companions and “inner circle” from al-Kufah’s elites and the “religiously well-versed” who his predecessor—al-Walid—had antagonized. It was not long until he got a “better feeling” for the public mood and communicated that to ‘Uthman.
Further, Sa‘id kept ‘Uthman meticulously abreast of a general geography that extends beyond al-Kufah. In his opinion, al-Kufah was in a pre-seditious state of affairs because of two factors. One was a dearth of the presence of the Prophet’s generation there. An assortment of the Prophet’s generation had settled in that area when it was liberated, but now their presence had diminished because of either natural causes or military sacrifices. The other factor was the profusion of new-comers and raw recruits, some of them civilians and others in the military, while some others of the population were amnestied or emancipated prisoners of war.
The general population was a potpourri of Muslims ranging from the declining number of committed Muslims, to the nominal Muslims. There were non-Muslims, there were Arabic speakers and non-Arabic speakers, there were ethnic and racial varieties, and there was what one may call cultural and social differences.
All of these considerations and elements are not easy to hurriedly stabilize or alleviate.
Apparently the Arabic speaking newcomers along with the non-Arabic speaking newcomers and their new generation(s) diluted the influential impact of divine commitment that the pioneering forerunners initially had on a receptive population.
The pendulum was swinging from the time al-Kufah was first established (17 AH) with the faith and fervor of the Prophetic generation to a watered down diversity generation of a lesser divine drive. Ignorance, inexperience, and illiteracy of the Qur’an, the Prophet (pbuh), and Islam may have been a reason. one could almost sense that there was something of a dis-connect between the moral foundations of Islam and its legal extension.
Here is where the primitive, nomadic, coarse, and roaming disposition of Arabians/Muslims came into contact with prisoners of war who carried with them a sense of national, cultural, historical and even racial pride if not arrogance. A civilization in ‘Iraq had crashed, and a new Islamic moral and legal way of life was taking hold.
Many prisoners of war from a defeated Persian superpower had to endure what they considered to be a humiliation as they were now overpowered by those they had hitherto considered to be inferior or a vassal group of people. There was a new cosmopolitan peer group that joined together feigned feelings of past superiority vs. current inferiority on one side, and past inferiority vs. current superiority on the other side. It takes a commitment of the Prophet (pbuh) and his generation to conquer such vestiges of the past.
Some of these undercurrents live on and can be observed in our “here and now”. These subtleties are what decision-makers had to deal with then, and they still are what decision-makers have to deal with nowadays.
These details were relayed by Sa‘id in al-Kufah to ‘Uthman in al-Madinah. ‘Uthman’s advice was to—as much as possible—give preference to policies and decisions that are kind and caring. Sedition, agitation, and confrontation should be avoided—sparing the people rabble-rousing and provocation. Those who have a record of solid Islamic commitment should take precedence over others, and others should be assessed on a graded scale of taqwa, no one ought to experience any form of prejudice, prejudgment or partisanship.
After receiving feedback and advice from the four corners of the Islamic constituency, ‘Uthman eventually began to sense that the popular mood was changing and trouble and turmoil were in the air. Now, measures have to be taken to preempt social instability and political polarization.
‘Uthman delivered a khutbah in al-Madinah divulging to the committed Muslim public that dangerous days may be approaching, cautioning them to avert any traps and schemes, and alarmed them of probable ensuing grave consequences.
He consulted the rank and file of al-Madinah concerning the advice he proposed to Sa‘id (see above), and they concurred. Then ‘Uthman put into motion a policy that he thought would bring people closer together which also thrilled the people in Arabia, and that was to have the general revenue of taxes, levies and duties charged to the non-Muslims transferred to the interior of Arabia thereby encouraging Arabs (Muslims) who left Arabia proper to return to be able to receive their share of that revenue but at the same time causing an economic/financial difficulty and dilemma for the population from whom that revenue was obtained.
The Muslims doing their military service would, of course, have to remain in their frontier positions but some Muslims who had just left Arabia to “greener pastures” began to think about returning to “where the money is”. The committed Muslims on second thought could not see justice done by this policy. But then ‘Uthman to a certain degree convinced them by saying that those who are relocating from ‘Iraq and the periphery of the Islamic state to its interior will have to sell what they had purchased/acquired in the periphery to qualify for land at no cost in Hijaz and its surrounding region. This would result, according to ‘Uthman’s assessment, in massive family reunions and a scaling down of the movement of people from Arabia to the surrounding territories and countries.
This reverse immigration of Muslims back to internal Arabia was thought to be an advantageous and cost-effective plan as it would create job opportunities and even a relocation of job-seeking non-Arabs/Muslims and thus a “booming economy”. Keep in mind that there were thousands of prisoners of war and indentured laborers and apprentices whose task it was for the government in al-Madinah to offer them a better standard of living and above all to have them committed and faithful to Allah (swt) and His Prophet (pbuh).
Of course the people of Hijaz would prefer living in Hijaz rather than living in ‘Iraq, and the people of Yemen would prefer living in Yemen rather than living in Egypt or Syria, etc… this ‘Uthmani policy opened up a vista of economic, social, political, and intellectual activities and rigor.
انما الأعمال بالنيات [Implementations are traced to intentions]… Hadith Sharif
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