Yusuf Dhia-Allah
Although there is much talk about an inevitable second-round military confrontation between Islamic Iran and the trio—the US, EU, and Israel—the likelihood of such an event soon is lower than the media suggests.
Before analyzing why, let us first consider the main reasons analysts cite when forecasting such a conflict erupting soon.
One of the common arguments for predicting a second round of military confrontation is that the trio failed to achieve meaningful results during the 12-day war against Iran in June.
Those who argue that the trio will soon launch another attack against Iran claim that Israel and its western enablers believe time is not on their side. They point to US midterm elections on November 3, 2026 and Iran’s rapid military reconfiguration and buildup as factors creating urgency.
According to this view, the trio would prefer to strike now rather than later, before Iran becomes even stronger and before shifting political conditions globally constrain their options.
Yet the very failure of the sudden June attacks against Iran makes another immediate attack less likely. It is important to recall the key outcomes of the June aggression.
First, Israel was struck heavily with ballistic missiles, demonstrating Iran’s ability to mount a decisive military response and undermining the long-standing perception of American and Israeli military invincibility.
Second, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors are no longer present in Iran, meaning there is reduced international oversight of its nuclear activities, which shifts the balance of leverage further in Tehran’s favor.
Third, new, undeclared nuclear enrichment sites have likely been established, creating additional uncertainty for Israel and its western backers about the scope of Iran’s nuclear capabilities.
Finally, negotiations with the Trump regime have ceased, signaling that Iran no longer feels compelled to engage diplomatically under pressure.
Collectively, these developments suggest that the aggression backfired, leaving Iran stronger both politically and strategically, while weakening the position of the trio.
A surprise offensive is most effective when the opposing side is not expecting it. Tehran was not expecting the attack in June, lulled by the false promise of the sixth round of negotiations that were to be held in two days’ time. While a number of senior military commanders and nuclear scientists were martyred, Iran quickly recovered and managed to deliver crushing blows to Israel.
Right now, Iran is on heightened alert and ready to respond. Launching another attack under such conditions would carry much greater risk for the trio and an even lower chance of success, which reduces the trio’s incentive to act in the short term.
It should be noted, however, that our assessment assumes a rational policy framework. Given that the ringleaders of the current zionist regime—and their less-than-astute enablers in Washington—often act irrationally, our assessment may not fully apply.
While there are rational reasons to believe the trio will not launch an attack anytime soon, there are also sound arguments suggesting that Islamic Iran may take the initiative and carry out preventive measures against Israel on its own terms. This does not mean Iran will rush into war, but rather that it is unlikely to continue deliberately delaying it.
It is becoming increasingly clear that Islamic Iran and its allies are recalibrating their political and military framework.
A second direct attack would likely convince both Iran’s leadership and public opinion that the current approach—prioritizing political measures over military ones—must be reversed, with military action taking priority. In such a scenario, Israel would face a far more extensive and sustained response from Iran, potentially broader in scope and longer in duration than it experienced during 12-day war it unleashed against Iran.
Since 1979, one of Iran’s key strengths in outmaneuvering the US and its surrogates has been its ability to synchronize actions with both political realities on the ground and the prevailing societal mood in the region.
As Israel continues its genocide in Palestine with western backing, regional dynamics—both within the corridors of power and across wider society—are shifting rapidly.
Even US–Israeli surrogates in West Asia are beginning to recognize that subservience has not brought them security, as demonstrated by the consequences of zionist air strikes in Qatar.
While this does not mean the GCC regimes will suddenly join Iran’s Axis of Resistance, they now have far less incentive to create obstacles for Iran and its allies.
One of the factors that enabled the trio to launch direct attacks on Iran was their ability to establish assets in Damascus.
While HTS terrorists-turned-statesmen do not exercise complete control over all of Syria, their presence has contributed to the erosion of Syria’s functionality as a state.
This has created conditions that Israel and its western partners are exploiting, including the use of Syrian airspace as a corridor and refueling zone for operations against Iran and its allies in Iraq.
Given this context, Iran appears to regard Syria as a critical element in its broader confrontation with Israel. At present, Tehran seems to favor political strategies aimed at reducing the likelihood of HTS involvement against its regional allies. The assumption is that engaging certain factions within the HTS, even if only partially successful, could help reestablish some degree of logistical connectivity with Lebanon and Palestine.
While a second round between Islamic Iran and Israel appears inevitable at some point in the future, it is more likely to occur during the final months of the Trump presidency.
From Iran’s perspective, such timing could offer a unique political advantage for a pre-emptive strike on Israel. Trump has already disrupted relations with key American allies, leaving the US more isolated on the global stage than ever before.
Today, America is widely perceived as a declining power, increasingly mistrusted abroad and internally divided.
Moreover, history suggests that US presidents are reluctant to initiate or escalate unpopular wars during an election year. For instance, Lyndon Johnson chose not to run for re-election in 1968 amid the unpopularity of the Vietnam War, while both George W. Bush in 2008 and Barack Obama in 2012 avoided opening new fronts of military conflict during their campaigns.
These precedents strengthen the view that Trump would be unlikely to commit to a large-scale war with Iran in the run-up to an election in order to keep his MAGA crowd in power. This will reduce Israel’s ability to secure full American backing without which it cannot fight a war.
The ongoing regional conflict is heading toward renewed Iran–Israel war, but it will occur on Iran’s terms—and not before its time.
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