S. Haider Mehdi
In an unprecedented break from protocol, US President Donald Trump hosted Pakistan Army Chief, General Asim Munir, for lunch on June 18. This meeting followed the recently concluded India-Pakistan conflict (May 2025), which Trump publicly claimed to have mediated, a statement furiously denied by New Delhi.
In its aftermath, the Pakistani regime formally nominated Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize. Soon thereafter, the zionist regime led by the indicted war criminal Benjamin Netanyahu did the same.
The optics of Trump’s lunch for Munir sent ripples in both Washington and Islamabad. The symbolism was clear. Trump was elevating the Pakistan army chief to a level of engagement typically reserved for heads of state although the relationship remains that of master and slave.
What exactly transpired in that room has remained shrouded in speculation, but highly reliable sources in the US State Department and among senators with knowledge of the meeting suggest three central themes dominated: Pakistan’s potential inclusion in the US-backed “Abraham Accords,” the contentious question of Imran Khan’s imprisonment and possible release, and discussions on economic cooperation involving Pakistan’s mineral wealth and arms and energy purchases from Washington.
Terrorism as bargaining chip
Both Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Balochistan provinces of Pakistan, rich in resources but scarred by insurgency, were central to this conversation. KP faces relentless violence from Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Islamic State of Khorasan (ISKP), while Balochistan remains plagued by separatist insurgencies such as the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF).
Since January 2025, over 2,200 people have been killed in terrorism-related violence, including 743 security personnel (mostly soldiers and officers of the Pakistan Army), 403 civilians, and over 1,068 militants. July was the deadliest month of the year, with 343 fatalities.
At the lunch, General Munir reportedly played the “terrorism card” to maximum effect, portraying himself as the indispensable bulwark against militancy and instability in Pakistan. He argued that only under his centralized military rule could US interests in South Asia be safeguarded. He pressed the case that releasing former Prime Minister Imran Khan, incarcerated and convicted by pliant civilian courts on widely discredited charges, would undermine US interests. Khan, after all, has maintained an uncompromising refusal to recognize Israel absent a just Palestinian settlement and has consistently advocated for an independent Pakistani foreign policy, unencumbered by either Washington or Beijing.
Trump’s priorities, Security not Economics
Yet the chatter from within Washington circles suggested otherwise. According to a senior DC commentator close to Trump’s inner circle, the president’s priorities were clear. “Trump views Pakistan primarily through a security prism, not an economic one. Recognition of Israel, the stability of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, and alignment against Iran are at the top of his agenda. China matters less for now, despite its Belt and Road stakes in Pakistan.”
Trump’s reported “asks” were blunt, deliver recognition of Israel within two weeks and ensure the release of Imran Khan. Neither has materialized.
Munir’s second US visit, a failure
In August, Asim Munir returned to the United States, officially to attend the US Central Command (CENTCOM) change-of-command ceremony in Tampa, Florida. The outgoing commander, General Michael Kurilla, was widely believed to have championed Munir’s elevation as Army Chief in November 2022, leading to his reputation in some circles as “Washington’s man in Rawalpindi.”
Observers in both countries were surprised at Munir’s presence, as it is highly unusual for foreign military chiefs within CENTCOM’s area of operations to attend such ceremonial events. Analysts speculated that Munir sought to leverage his personal rapport with US commanders and to swear informal fealty to the incoming CENTCOM chief, Admiral Brad Cooper, knowing CENTCOM’s influence in shaping US policy toward Pakistan.
Expectations ran high that Munir would secure meetings with Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, or Special Envoy Richard Grenell. Even a second meeting with Trump was rumored. Instead, the trip was a diplomatic failure, no senior US government meetings materialized.
Munir was reduced to attending diaspora-organized events, at one of which he issued a reckless warning, “If India attacks Pakistan, let them not forget that we are a nuclear power and will take down half of the world with us.” To threaten nuclear Armageddon while on US soil was viewed as a highly irresponsible and desperate act.
Escalating crackdown on Imran Khan
Upon his return, Munir escalated his repression of Imran Khan and his family. The former prime minister remains in solitary confinement, denied family visits for weeks, cut off from newspapers, television, and books. His wife, a non-political private citizen, has also been imprisoned under harsh conditions.
More recently, Khan’s nephews, sons of his outspoken sister Aleema Khan, were arrested on charges linked to the May 9, 2023 protests, despite the arrests occurring 28 months after the fact. One nephew, Shahrez Khan, an international triathlete with no political history, was not even in Lahore at the time, but visiting his wife’s family 700 kilometers away.
This wave of arrests is widely seen as Munir’s attempt to force Khan to make a deal, accept release on condition of a two-year political exile, drop demands for investigations into the May 9 riots and the February 2024 elections (which Khan’s party won by a landslide), and thereby allow Munir to present Khan’s “release” as a concession to Washington.
But on the more difficult demand, recognition of Israel, Munir remains trapped. The idea is political suicide. Anti-Israel sentiment in Pakistan is overwhelming, cutting across civil society, religious movements, and even the rank and file of the Army itself.
Munir’s dwindling options
What, then, are Munir’s options? Analysts suggest that he is seeking to consolidate absolute power by suspending or bending Pakistan’s fragile constitutional framework, packing the judiciary with loyalists, and staging an “accountability process” against rivals, perhaps even targeting his own current allies in the Pakistan Muslim League (N) and Pakistan People’s Party.
Such a gambit would allow him to release Khan into house arrest, muzzle the media, and attempt to manufacture enough space to push through recognition of Israel. But even this appears improbable. “A snowball,” one Pakistani analyst quipped, “has a better chance in hell than Munir does of selling Israel’s recognition to the Pakistani public.”
Compounding his difficulties are mounting rumblings within the military itself. There is open speculation that his tenure could end abruptly, either through internal dissent or external pressure.
Trump’s choices
This leaves Trump facing a pivotal choice. Does he continue to back an army chief increasingly viewed as a liability, a “dead man walking” with little legitimacy at home and no credibility abroad? Does he instruct CENTCOM to quietly groom another Pakistani general more aligned with Washington’s interests? Or does he seize the opportunity to pivot, choosing to support democracy, civilian supremacy, and human rights in Pakistan rather than perpetually propping up military strongmen?
The stakes are immense. Pakistan remains a nuclear-armed state at the crossroads of South Asia, bordering China, Afghanistan, and Iran. Its trajectory will profoundly affect not only regional stability but also America’s long-term credibility in advocating democratic governance.
For now, both Trump and Munir appear caught in a dangerous stalemate, a US president pressing for deliverables that Pakistan’s general cannot credibly deliver, and an army chief trying to buy time through repression at home and symbolism abroad.
Ultimately, Pakistan’s crisis exposes a larger dilemma for Washington. Should US policy toward Pakistan continue to be filtered through the narrow lens of military strongmen, or should it be reoriented toward supporting genuine democratic forces and institutions?
Asim Munir may attempt to cling to power by crushing dissent and cutting deals. Yet the more he does so, the more he weakens Pakistan’s institutional fabric, and the less able he becomes to deliver on Washington’s strategic asks.
Will Trump tie US policy to the fate of one embattled general or recognize that only a Pakistan governed by democratic legitimacy, constitutional order, and popular consent can provide the sustainable partnership America seeks. Anything less will remain fragile, short-term, and fraught with instability. Past US-Pakistan relations do not give much hope.
The decision rests in Washington. But its consequences will reverberate far beyond Islamabad.
Pakistan’s de facto ruler, General Asim Munir, self-appointed Field Marshal, debased himself before Donald Trump for a morsel of mutton. T...
