Islamic Movement

The Power Paradigm: Operationalizing The Seerah And Stages Of Islamic Revolution

Muslim Mahmood

Rajab 12, 14472026-01-01

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Based on Dr. Kalim Siddiqui book, Stages of Islamic Revolution, the argument presented in “Urgent Need for change in the Muslim World” by Zafar Bangash in Crescent International (December 2025), is not just a call to action, but the summary of a specific historical and political theory. Dr. Siddiqui argued that the decline of the “House of Islam” occurred because Muslims lost the “method of movement” found in the Seerah and Sunnah, replacing it with stagnant theology or western political mimicry.

Here are the logical steps and the stages of Islamic Revolution derived directly from the text to operationalize the argument.

1: From Intellectual Revolution to Power

To achieve liberation, Dr Siddiqui suggests a move away from “Islamic parties” (Jama‘at-e Islami, Ikhwan et al) that operate within western democratic/nationalist frameworks, toward a revolutionary “Islamic Movement”.

Step 1: The Intellectual Revolution (Correcting the Vision)

We must reject the “western view of Islam” which treats it merely as a ‘religion’ or a cultural identity.

· Action: Re-examine the Seerah not as a collection of static facts or miracles, but as a “divine paradigm” of a political system builder. · The Shift: Move from “descriptive” history (dates/battles) to “analytical” history (concepts/methods).

Step 2: Generating “Political Thought” through the Power Prism

Dr. Siddiqui argues that political thought is situational but must be rooted in the Seerah.

· Action: Analyze how the Prophet (ﷺ) generated power. He started with “axioms” (revelation) and a handful of followers, moved to a “system without territory” (Makkah), and finally achieved a “system with territory” (Madinah).

· Goal: Recognize that power is not just military hardware; it is the “capacity to regenerate” and “overcome overwhelming odds”.

Step 3: Consensus and Convergence

Before a total revolution can occur, the internal divisions of the Ummah must be healed by focusing on political convergence rather than theological uniformity.

· Action: Place divisive theology in a “black box” (bypass it) and focus on the political convergence of Sunni and Shi‘i thought regarding leadership (Khilafah/Imamah).

· Goal: A global consensus that the existing world order is unjust and that the Islamic State is the only solution.

2. Stages of Islamic Revolution

Dr. Siddiqui describes the revolution not as a single event, but as a cumulative process involving specific phases.

Stage 1: The Intellectual and Partial Revolutions history does not move in leaps. It accumulates pressure through “interim movements” and “partial revolutions”.

· Characteristics: These are movements that may fail to establish the Islamic State but successfully mobilize the masses or clarify political thought (e.g., the Jihad movement in India, the Khilafah Movement, or the creation of Pakistan).

· Function: They serve as a “learning process” and accumulate the experience necessary for the final stage.

Stage 2: The “Event” (The Total Revolution)

Dr. Siddiqui defines the Islamic Revolution as “that point in time when changes in the outlook, values and preferences of a people... suddenly change their collective behaviour”.

· Requirement: It requires a muttaqi leadership that commands the total obedience of the masses.

· Action: The total demolition of the old order. The text warns that if the old order is not destroyed, its “germs” will infect the new state (as seen in the early days of Iran’s Islamic revolution with liberal/nationalist elements).

Stage 3: Birth of the Islamic State

The State is described as the “child” of the Revolution.

· Definition: The Islamic State is not a democracy or a dictatorship; it is a “moral structure” where the leadership and people share a single defined purpose based on Taqwa and ‘Adl (social justice).

· Power Dynamic: The State must initially be protected by the revolutionary power of the masses until it generates its own institutional power through achievement.

Stage 4: Consolidation and Expansion (Movement & Achievement)

A political system survives by generating power. This occurs through a feedback loop.

4.1. Movement: The system pushes forward (e.g., Hijra to Madinah).

4.2. Achievement: Success generates “surplus power” (e.g., Victory at Badr).

4.3. Power: This surplus is invested into higher goals.

· Note: The text cites the war imposed on Iran as a mechanism that, while costly, consolidated the revolution’s authority and hardened its defenses.

3. Comparison: Political Party vs. Islamic Movement

Dr. Siddiqui emphatically rejects the “Political Party” model used by movements like the Ikhwan (Muslim Brotherhood) or the Jama‘at-e-Islami. Their goal is to win elections within the imposed system and share power. They have exclusivist membership rules with a hierarchical structure. They operate on short-term basis and are pressured to show results. This forces them into ompromises and horse-trading. They also accept secular nationalism resulting in “partial” success or even total failure.

The Islamic movement, on the other hand, is revolutionary in nature. It has an open system with no formal membership. Its goal is to overthrow the existing system to bring about total change. Its approach is long-term and waits for historical maturity to develop. It does not compromise with taghuti forces and rejects “national” boundaries. Its goal is total revolution (example Iran).

Recommended Next Step

Dr. Siddiqui places great emphasis on the “Power Dimension” of the Seerah as the “unopened treasure-chest of Islam”. The “Power Prism” reinterprets the Seerah not merely as a record of religious piety, but as the blueprint of a political architect building a system capable of overcoming entrenched systems.

Here is an evaluation of specific historical examples Dr. Siddiqui uses to illustrate the “Power Dimension” of the Prophet’s (ﷺ) method.

1. System Without Territory: Makkah as the Incubator

The Makkan period was a calculated phase of building a political system that possessed axioms (revelation) and leadership, but lacked physical power.

· The Event: The Prophet’s use of tribal protection and the migration to Abyssinia.

· The Power Analysis: Utilizing Existing Structures:

Initially, the movement had no power of its own. The Prophet used his status within the Banu Hashim clan to survive the economic boycott.

Diplomacy: He sought protection and alliances with external powers (the Negus of Ethiopia).

Dr. Siddiqui posits that the Makkan phase was not passive suffering; it was a period of active negotiation and searching for a “territorial base”. The Sahaba (companions) were already thinking in terms of global power, taking bets on when the Byzantine and Persian empires would fall (Surat al-Rum, verses 2-6).

1. The Covenants of ‘Aqabah: The Transition to Statehood
2. Dr. Siddiqui identifies the meetings at ‘Aqabah (outside Makkah) not just as spiritual conversions, but as the decisive political turning point where the movement acquired the “capacity” for statehood.

· The Event: The two secret meetings with the tribes from Yathrib (Madinah).

· The Power Analysis:

First Covenant: A moral agreement with 12 men.

Second Covenant: A “political and military pact” with 73 men and two women. This pact extended unqualified protection to the Prophet.

This was the moment the “Power Prism” shifted. The movement secured “dependable allies” and a “territorial base” outside the reach of the Quraish. It allowed the Prophet to move from a “statesman without a State” to a “statesman with a State”.

1. The Hijra (Migration): Operationalizing Movement

Dr. Siddiqui treats the Hijra not as a flight from persecution, but as a strategic deployment of forces to a secure base.

· The Event: The migration of Muslims and the Prophet to Madinah.

· The Power Analysis:

System Transformation: The Hijra transformed the system from one relying on “borrowed power” (tribal protection) to one generating its own “systemic power”.

Upon arrival, the Prophet immediately consolidated power, turning Madinah into Madinatun Nabi (City of the Prophet).

Movement is a prerequisite for generating power. The physical relocation allowed the “axioms” of Islam to be converted into a functional social and political structure.

1. The “Pre-emptive” Expeditions and Badr This is perhaps Dr. Siddiqui’s most distinctive “political” reading of the Seerah. He rejects the pacifist interpretation of the Prophet’s military career.

The early raids on caravans moving between Madinah and the Red Sea were “pre-emptive expeditions”. They were designed to weaken the enemy’s economy and military capability before they could invade Madinah.

The victory at Badr (300 Muslims vs. 1,000 Quraish) was the “turning point” where Islam came of age as a military power. In Dr. Siddiqui’s model, a system must “achieve goals or lose power”. The victory at Badr generated “surplus power” (prestige, booty, morale) that could be invested into further expansion.

Dr. Siddiqui views the Prophet’s sustained military activity as a method of maintaining revolutionary momentum. The Prophet launched no fewer than 63 military campaigns. In most campaigns (over half), the Prophet did not participate personally but appointed a commander, teaching the Sahaba leadership and responsibility.

Continuous Mobilization: These campaigns were “partial revolutions” designed to keep the momentum high and build upon the power achieved through the Hijra.

This counters the view of Da‘wah (invitation to Islam) as a purely pacifist activity. Dr. Siddiqui argues that these campaigns consolidated Muslim society and broke tribal loyalties, a political necessity for the new State.

Summary of Dr. Siddiqui’s Evaluation

Dr. Siddiqui concludes that the Prophet was an “architect building a political system”. The failure of contemporary Muslims, he argues, stems from viewing these events merely as religious rituals rather than as a “method of historical transformation”.

· Key Lesson: “Real power is the ability to overcome overwhelming odds” (as seen at Badr and in the modern Afghan Jihad), not just the possession of technology or numbers.

The text mentions that a key failure of modern Islamic movements is their adoption of nationalism and democracy within existing systems.

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